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THE APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT TO
UNIDENTIFIABLE TORTFEASORS UNDER
INDIANA'S COMPARATIVE FAULT STATUTE:
WHAT'S IN A "NAME"?
The court cannot deny that Indiana's Comparative Fault Act
gives rise to numerous uncertainties and is potentially harsh in
certain instances. As post-Act litigation develops, some of these
uncertainties will be resolved, and the legislature may be called
upon to mollify some of the Act's potential harshness.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Indiana became the fortieth state to join the increasing num-
ber of jurisdictions to adopt some form of a comparative fault system.2 In-
1. Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 512 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (Barker, J.).
2. Chapter 33. Comparative Fault
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-1 (Supp. 1988). Application of chapter; causation
Sec. 1. (a) This chapter governs any action based on fault that is brought to recover
damages for injury or death to person or harm to property, except that it does not apply
to an action brought against a qualified health care provider under IC 16-9.5 for medical
malpractice.
(b) In an action brought under this chapter, legal requirements of causal relation apply
to:
(1) fault as the basis for liability; and
(2) contributory fault.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2 (Supp. 1988). Definitions; defendant as single party
See. 2. (a) As used in this chapter:
"Fault" includes any act or omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, or reckless to-
ward the person or property of the actor or others, but does not include an intentional
act. The term also includes unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforcea-
ble express consent, incurred risk and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to miti-
gate damages.
"Nonparty" means a person who is, or may be, liable to the claimant in part or in
whole for the damages claimed but who has not been joined in the action as a defendant
by the claimant. A nonparty shall not include the employer of the claimant.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-3 (Supp. 1988). Effect of contributory fault
Sec. 3. In an action based on fault, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant
diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury
attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery except as pro-
vided in section 4 of this chapter.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-4 (Supp. 1988). Barring of recovery; degree of contributory fault
Sec. 4. (a) In an action based on fault that is brought against:
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(I) one (1) defendant; or
(2) two (2) or more defendants who may be treated as a single party;
the claimant is barred from recovery if his contributory fault is greater than the fault of
all persons whose fault proximately contributed to claimant's damages.
(b) In an action based on fault that is brought against two (2) or more defendants, the
claimant is barred from recovery if his contributory fault is greater than the fault of all
persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5 (Supp. 1988). Instructions to jury; award of damages
Sec. 5. (a)...
(b) In an action based on fault that is brought against two (2) or more defendants, and
that is tried to a jury, the court, unless all the parties agree otherwise, shall instruct the
jury to determine its verdict in the following manner:
(1) The jury shall determine the percentage of fault of the claimant, of the defendants,
and of any person who is a nonparty. The percentage of fault figures of parties to the
action may total less than one hundred percent (100%) if the jury finds that fault con-
tributing to cause the claimant's loss has also come from a nonparty or nonparties.
(2) If the percentage of fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the
total fault involved in the incident which caused the claimant's death, injury, or property
damages, the jury shall return a verdict for the defendants and no further deliberation of
the jury is required.
(3) If the percentage of fault of the claimant is not greater than fifty percent (50%) of
the total fault, the jury shall then determine the total amount of damages the claimant
would be entitled to recover if contributory fault were disregarded.
(4) The jury next shall multiply the percentage of fault of each defendant by the
amount of damages determined under subdivision (3) and shall enter a verdict against
each such defendant (and such other defendants as are liable with the defendant by rea-
son of their relationship to such defendant) in the amount of the product of the multipli-
cation of each defendant's percentage of fault times the amount of damages as deter-
mined under subdivision (3).
(c) In an action based on fault that is tried by the court without a jury, the court shall
make its award of damages according to the principles specified in subsections (a) and
(b) for juries.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6 (Supp. 1988). Forms of verdicts; disclosure requirements
Sec. 6. The court shall furnish to the jury forms of verdicts that require the disclosure
of:
(1) the percentage of fault charged against each party; and
(2) the calculations made by the jury to arrive at their final verdict.
If the evidence in the action is sufficient to support the charging of fault to a nonparty,
the form of verdict also shall require a disclosure of the name of the nonparty and the
percentage of fault charged to the nonparty.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-9 (Supp. 1988). Verdict; inconsistent award with determinations of
total damages and percentages of fault
Sec. 9. In actions brought under this chapter, whenever a jury returns verdicts in which
the ultimate amounts awarded are inconsistent with its determinations of total damages
and percentages of fault, the trial court shall:
(1) inform the jury of such inconsistencies;
(2) order them to resume deliberations to correct the inconsistencies; and
(3) instruct them that they are at liberty to change any portion or portions of the
verdicts to correct the inconsistencies.
IND. CODE § 34-4-33-10 (Supp. 1988). Nonparty defense; assertion; burden of proof; plead-
ings; application
Sec. 10. (a) In an action based on fault, a defendant may assert as a defense that the
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diana adopted comparative fault by legislative enactment 3 to alleviate the
harsh results produced by the doctrine of contributory negligence.4 Since
implementation of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act in 1985, the few re-
ported decisions interpreting the Act have dealt mainly with the procedural
requirement of specifically pleading the non-party defense and the definition
of "non-party" as related to state entities and employees.5
However, the issue of "naming" an unidentifiable or "phantom" non-
party tortfeasor for fault assessment purposes under the Indiana Act has
only recently been addressed by one Indiana court and remains unaddressed
by the legislature, and will undoubtedly continue to be a source of contro-
versy. The nature of this issue is exemplified by the statutory language of
the Comparative Fault Act. Section Two of the Act defines non-party as
follows:
"Nonparty" means a person who is, or may be, liable to the
claimant in part or in whole for the damages claimed but who
has not been joined in the action as a defendant by the claimant.
damages of the claimant were caused in full or in part by a nonparty. Such a defense is
referred to in this section as a nonparty defense.
(b) The burden of proof of a nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirm-
atively plead the defense. However, nothing in this chapter relieves the claimant of the
burden of proving that fault on the party of the defendant or defendants caused, in whole
or in part, the damages of the claimant.
(c) A nonparty defense that is known by the defendant when he files his first answer
shall be pleaded as a part of the first answer. A defendant who gains actual knowledge of
a nonparty defense after the filing of an answer may plead the defense with reasonable
promptness. However, if the defendant was served with a complaint and summons more
than one hundred fifty (150) days before the expiration of the limitation of action appli-
cable to the claimant's claim against the nonparty, the defendant shall plead any non-
party defense not later than forty-five (45) days before the expiration of that limitation of
action. The trial court may alter these time limitations or make other suitable time limi-
tations in any manner that is consistent with:
(1) giving the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover the existence of a non-
party defense; and
(2) giving the claimant a reasonable opportunity to add the nonparty as an additional
defendant to the action before the expiration of the period of limitation applicable to the
claim.
3. Becker, Indiana's Comparative Fault Law: A Legislator's View, 17 IND. L. REV.
881 (1984).
4. Id. See also Yosha, Indiana's Comparative Fault Act: Part I, 27 RES GESTAE 413
(1984).
5. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. See also Walters v. Dean, 497 N.E.2d
247, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (apportionment of fault to non-party only when non-party de-
fense is specially pleaded); Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (state high-
way department is a non-party for purposes of the Act); Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking, Co.,
659 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (separate state entities are not employers of workers of
other state entities for purposes of the non-party provision of the Act).
1989]
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A nonparty shall not include the employer of the claimant.'
Section Ten of the Act allows:
(a) In an action based on fault, a defendant may assert as a
defense that the damages of the claimant were caused in full or
in part by a nonparty. Such a defense is referred to in this sec-
tion as a nonparty defense.7
Yet, section Six of the Act requires that:
If the evidence in the action is sufficient to support the charging
of fault to a nonparty, the form of verdict also shall require a
disclosure of the name of the nonparty and the percentage of
fault charged to the nonparty. (emphasis added).'
On their face the clarity of these sections seems readily apparent when read
individually. However, for purposes of the Comparative Fault Act sections
Two, Ten, and Six must be considered together,9 and when this is at-
tempted, these sections cause much confusion to a practitioner attempting
to discern the proper approach to be pursued when confronted with the Act.
The section Two definition of non-party is functional when used in con-
junction with the non-party defense in section Ten, which allows a defend-
ant to assert as a defense the fault of a party who is, or may be, liable to
the plaintiff for the harm caused. However, neither section Two nor section
Ten require that the defendant "name" the non-party when pleading the
non-party defense. Yet, as required in section Six, if the jury is going to
assess fault to that non-party, the jury must "name" that non-party.
Hence, the central issue to be considered is what constitutes the suffi-
cient "naming" of a non-party for purposes of the Comparative Fault Act
so that the jury may take the non-party into consideration for fault assess-
ment purposes. Particularly, when the action involves a "phantom" or
unidentifiable tortfeasor, will "the unidentified driver of the red automo-
bile" 10 suffice for identification, or must the defendant, since he has the
burden of asserting the non-party defense, name the non-party with speci-
ficity so that the non-party may be identified?
This problem will arise in many instances. Consider, for example, a
blue automobile traveling on a city street. Suddenly, without warning, a red
car darts out in front of the blue automobile. Because of the negligence of
6. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2 (Supp. 1988).
7. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-10 (Supp. 1988).
8. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6 (Supp. 1988).
9. See Suburban Homes Corp. v. Harders, 404 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(statutes must be construed as a whole).
10. Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 41 Wis.2d 661, 165 N.W. 2d
162 (1969).
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the driver of the red car, the driver of the blue car skids out of control and
strikes an oncoming vehicle. The red car, not knowing of the accident, con-
tinues on and is never identified. By applying the Indiana Comparative
Fault Act, the Indiana courts could continue to resolve the controversy over
whether fault may be assessed to the unidentifiable driver in several ways,
but not without confusion and conflicting results.11 However, the Indiana
legislature, by adding a definition of "name" to the Indiana Comparative
Fault Act, can easily clarify the issue of "naming" an unidentifiable
tortfeasor for fault assessment purposes.
This note first traces the historical development of comparative fault in
the United States by specifically examining contributory negligence, early
comparative negligence, and the various forms of comparative negligence
most prevalent in the Untied States today. Next, the two main approaches
of fault apportionment are highlighted. The third section outlines the devel-
opment of comparative fault in Indiana with an emphasis on application of
the recently adopted Indiana Comparative Fault Act. Finally, this note will
identify and analyze the problem of "naming" an unidentifiable non-party
for fault assessment purposes under the Indiana Act. This note concludes
that the current comparative fault statute should be amended to provide for
a concrete definition of "name" as used in the Indiana Comparative Fault
Act.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The common law rule of contributory negligence denies recovery to a
plaintiff contributing to his own harm. If an injured plaintiff contributes to
his own injury, even if only in the slightest degree, the strict application of
contributory negligence completely bars the plaintiff's recovery."2 Through-
out the years, many courts began adopting a substantial number of excep-
tions to the all-or-nothing common law approach of contributory negligence
until, in the late 1960s, a "stampede" of jurisdictions began abrogating the
doctrine altogether in favor of comparative negligence.' 3
A. Contributory Negligence: Accepted then Rejected
The contributory negligence doctrine was derived from the English
II. See infra notes 216-73 and accompanying text. See also Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968). Speaking to the issue of joinder of
parties the court noted that the parties may wish to avoid "inconsistent relief" in multiple
litigation. Id. at 103.
12. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE
L.J. 697 (1978).
13. Digges and Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland: The Time Has Come, 41 MD.
L. REV. 276 (1982).
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case of Butterfield v. Forrester.4 The doctrine was the general rule in Eng-
land for many years until Parliament abrogated the rule in 1945.15 Contrib-
utory negligence was first accepted in the United States in the early 1800s'6
and its development is generally attributed to the nature of the common
law's adversary system.17 At early common law, one objective of the judi-
cial system was to reduce the dispute between the parties to certain specific
issues and have the court decide for one party or the other., Because the
strict application of the rule completely barred recovery if the plaintiff was
slightly negligent, the application of the contributory negligence doctrine
served this objective well.' 9 Compromise was disfavored at common law and
was not even considered by the courts.20 In fact, comparing the negligence
of two parties to a lawsuit was unthinkable.2' One justification for the con-
tributory negligence rule is that the law remained unconvinced of the feasi-
bility of apportioning damages on a comparative negligence basis.2 2 Instead
of comparing the negligence of the parties, the law chose to leave a plaintiff
and defendant who were both at fault where it found them.23 The result
was a denial of recovery to an injured plaintiff who contributed to his own
harm.24
In the United States, contributory negligence developed simultaneously
with the growth of industry and business during the Industrial Revolution.25
14. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). In Butterfield, the plaintiff, riding his
horse at dusk at great speed was injured when he was knocked off his horse by a pole placed
across the road by the defendant. Lord Ellenborough noted that, "[a] party is not to cast
himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of
it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right . . .Two things
must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant,
and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." This proclamation
evolved into the doctrine of contributory negligence.
15. Henry, Why Not Comparative Negligence in Washington? 9-10, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE MONOGRAPH (A.T.L.A. 1970).
16. Digges and Klein, supra note 13, at 281 n.11, "By consensus, the first American
case to apply the doctrine [of contributory negligence] was Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.)
621 (1824)." The Smith case is factually similar to Butterfield.
17. James, Kalven, Keeton, Laflar, Malone, Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk -
Comparative Versus Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21
VAND. L. REV. 889, 940 (1968).
18. Id. As Wade points out, "It [contributory negligence] was black and white -all or
nothing." Id.
19. Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last - By Judicial Choice, 64 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 239, 242 (1976).
20. Wade, supra note 17, at 940.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally 38 AM. JUR., Negligence § 175 (1954).
24. Id.
25. Comment, Illinois Comparative Negligence: Multiple Parties, Multiple Problems,
1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 89, 90; see also Annotation, Comment Note - The Doctrine of Compara-
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The wide acceptance of contributory negligence was based on the idea that
America's economic expansion required protection from oversympathetic
juries.26 The juries regarded the growing corporate defendants as im-
mensely rich intruders who could afford to compensate the injured plaintiff
who was only slightly at fault.27 The rule therefore developed into a check
on oversympathetic juries, creating the need to reform the law.2 8
Several other justifications for the widespread acceptance of the con-
tributory negligence rule in the United States have also been advanced.
Since the common law did not favor compromise,29 the defense of contribu-
tory negligence was used to punish the plaintiff for his own misconduct."0
The plaintiff, it was said, had to come into court with "clean hands" and
could not be aided if he himself was at fault.3' A related justification for
application of contributory negligence was that the rule was intended to
discourage accidents by denying recovery to those who failed to use proper
care for their own safety.3 2
Many courts, however, were dissatisfied with the way the harsh all-or-
nothing approach of the contributory negligence rule barred recovery to
plaintiffs who were only slightly at fault. To alleviate the harshness of the
rule, these courts began adopting judicial exceptions to the rule.33 One no-
table exception is the doctrine of last clear chance.' 4
tive Negligence and Its Relation to the Doctrine of Contributory Neligence, 32 A.L.R.3d 463,
472 (1970).
26. Fleming, supra note 19, at 242. As Fleming notes, "An additional, transcendent
factor militating for reform has been the demoralizing effect of the broadscale flouting of the
stalemate rule by juries. Many have observed the proclivity of juries to 'compromise' by re-
turning verdicts for the plaintiff but substantially reducing the damages . . . " Id.
27. See Note, supra note 25, at 90. See also Annotation, supra note 25, at 472.
28. See Wade, supra note 17, at 943; See also Digges and Klein, supra note 13, at
278; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1953); Fleming, supra note 19,
at 243.
Fleming notes that,
[T]o the extent that it has been condoned by the courts (verdict compromising by juries),
it has also created a credibility gap between the 'official' law, as reflected in jury instruc-
tions and the books, and the law as practiced in the courtroom. While one of the vaunted
benefits of the jury system is that it can act as a corrective of legal rules in need of
reform, a healthy legal system requires that the properly accredited lawmakers heed the
hint and take responsibility for bringing the law once more into line with contemporary
demands."
Fleming, supra note 19, at 247.
29. See Wade, supra note 17, at 940.
30. Annotation, supra note 25, at 470.
31. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 722.
32. Id. at 703-04. See also Annotation, supra note 25, at 470.
33. See Fleming, supra note 19, at 894.
34. Id. at 894; See also Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Il1. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (1981). In
Alvis, the court noted that "the doctrine of 'last clear chance' was created to escape the harsh-
ness of the contributory negligence rule." Id. at 13, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
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The last clear chance doctrine seeks to place the entire blame on the
wrongdoer who had the last genuine opportunity to avoid the harm.35 The
doctrine allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover where the de-
fendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's perilous position, or had an oppor-
tunity to avoid injuring the plaintiff, but failed to exercise reasonable care
by not avoiding the accident."' Last clear chance, which originated in Eng-
land in 1842,1" was extensively criticized38 because the doctrine applied
only when the defendant's negligence was last in time.39 Thus, the doctrine
was merely a limited relief valve to contributory negligence.4" Most juris-
dictions which eventually adopted comparative negligence abolished the
doctrine of last clear chance by case law.41
In addition to the last clear chance exception, many juries began ignor-
ing court instructions on contributory negligence,4 and instead, began issu-
ing compromise verdicts4 in order to ameliorate the harsh effects of con-
tributory negligence. 44 This trend led to a decline in respectability and
support for the contributory negligence rule45 until the rule was eventually
abandoned by many states.46
The doctrine of contributory negligence fell increasingly into disfavor
35. 1 Rhodes, Litvin, & Sheridan, Comparative Negligence: Law & Practice, § 1.20[2]
(1988) [hereinafter 1 Rhodes].
36. Easterday and Easterday, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act: How Does It Com-
pare With Other Jurisdictions?, 17 IND. L. REv. 883, 891 (1984).
37. Davies v. Mann, 10 M & W 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. D. 1842).
38. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF ToRTs § 66, at 427 (4th ed. 1971); See also Kaatz v.
State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (The "last clear chance" doctrine becomes largely super-
fluous in jurisdictions which employ the comparative negligence rule).
39. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at § 1.2012], p. 1-33.
40. Id.
41. Easterday, supra note 36, at 891.
Many courts noted that the underlying rationale for last clear chance did not exist with-
out contributory negligence. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975), where the
court noted that, "the last clear chance doctrine is, in the final analysis, merely a means of
ameliorating the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. Without the contributory negli-
gence rule there would be no need for the palliative doctrine of last clear chance." Id. at 1050.
42. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1-34.
43. The reason for jury compromises, in addition to the rule's harshness, was that the
contemporary social values of the United States were changing toward the now social desirable
goal of compensating accident victims. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negli-
gence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151, 156 (1946).
44. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1-33; Keeton, supra note 17, at 916; Fleming, supra
note 19, at 243.
45. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1980). "[Tihere is something
basically wrong with a rule of law that is so contrary to the settled convictions of the lay
community that laymen will almost always refuse to enforce [contributory negligence], even
when solemnly told to do so by a judge whose instructions they have sworn to follow." Id.
46. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1-34.
[Vol. 23
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with American courts.4 7 Corresponding with the declining popularity of
contributory negligence was a movement toward widespread tort reform. 8
In the late 1960s and early 1970s no-fault insurance began attracting popu-
larity.' 9 In addition, heavy criticism of the common law tort system50 facili-
tated other reforms, notably the acceptance of a products liability tort ac-
tion.5 ' Comparative negligence 52 also began attracting significant support.5 3
As societal values evolved, corporations, and industry in general, no
longer needed to be protected by the courts and given such a disguised sub-
sidy.5' In addition, accident victim compensation had become a desirable
social goal which could be achieved by spreading losses through the use of
liability insurance.55 Contributory negligence was also weakened by work-
men's compensation statutes, which covered most claims against industrial
defendants,56 and by the acceptance of products liability actions.5 7
By the mid-1940s, England, where the contributory negligence rule
originated, had abandoned contributory negligence in favor of comparative
negligence.58 America had now become the final stronghold of the contribu-
tory negligence doctrine.5 9 By 1968, the weakening justifications for the
47. See generally Keeton, supra note 17, at 916; 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1-33;
Fleming, supra note 19, at 242-43.
48. See Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act - What Should It Provide?, 10 U.
Micn. J. L. REF. 220, 221 (1976-77).
49. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 697 n.5; See also Wade, supra note 48, at 221.
50. Wade, supra note 48, at 225; See also 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1-42.
51. Products liability was first recognized in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59
Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
52. Generally, comparative negligence does not bar a plaintiff's recovery if he is at
fault. The negligence of each party is compared and the plaintiff's recovery is reduced accord-
ing to his negligence. See infra notes 65-168 and accompanying text.
53. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 697. As Fleming notes, supra note 19, at 239,
Until the late 1960s only a handful of states had taken the embrace [of comparative
negligence], and that mostly many years before. Not so much legislative inertia as a
rigorous lobby mounted by the insurance industry and defense organizations had for gen-
erations successfully blocked persistent efforts at reform. This scene underwent a dra-
matic change when no-fault plans were unveiled. Opponents of these plans sought to
retrieve the substance of the common law fault system by half-heartedly offering for
sacrifice such notorious culprits as the absolute bar of contributory negligence.
54. Fleming, supra note 19, at 242.
55. Id.
56. Id. Workmen's Compensation benefits are due regardless of fault by the worker or
absence of fault by the employer. Id.
57. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963).
Contributory negligence in its strict application has been held in most jurisdictions not to
be a defense to strict products liability. See, e.g., I.C. 34-4-33-13 (Supp. 1988).
58. Id. See also Henry, supra note 15, at 9-10, for a listing of those countries aban-
doning contributory negligence for comparative negligence.
59. Fleming, supra note 19, at 242; Annotation, supra note 25, at 469 n.15; Wade,
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contributory negligence rule,60 and the problem of jury compromise,61 made
it clear that the doctrine of contributory negligence had become a
"deplorable blight on the legal system." 2 Furthermore, contributory negli-
gence was no longer defensible within the framework of modern societal
trends toward compensating plaintiffs." Many jurisdictions began to aban-
don contributory negligence in favor of some method of comparative negli-
gence. The rush to abandon contributory negligence turned what was once
a "march" toward comparative negligence into a "stampede."'"
B. The Development of Comparative Negligence in the United States
Although many states adopted some method of comparative fault in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, 6 5 the doctrine of comparative fault has a
history dating perhaps to the Roman Empire.66 While no original date for
the origin of comparative negligence can be established, many commenta-
tors agree that the doctrine may have evolved from international maritime
rules adopted by the English admiralty courts in the early 1700s.67 These
courts applied the equal division rule68 to admiralty cases until England
later modified this rule to one of pure comparative negligence in 1945.69
supra note 17, at 899 n.14.
60. Fleming, supra note 19, at 243-44. As Fleming notes,
No more persuasive has been the argument that contributory negligence promotes self-
protective care and thus prevents accidents: for one thing, the sanction seems unduly
harsh and, for another, it would be more effective if it fell on or deterred both plaintiff
and defendant. More serious perhaps was the defense prognosis that a change to compar-
ative negligence would lead to a substantial increase of insurance rates. This appears not
to have been borne out by verifiable experience.
Id.
61. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
62. Keeton, supra note 17, at 913.
63. Id.
64. Digges and Klein, supra note 13, at 276.
65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 8-9 (1974). The academic controversy
over whether comparative negligence in fact finds its origins in ancient Rome centers on inter-
pretation of a provision of Justinian's Digest. Id.
67. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI-KENT L. REV. 189, 226
(1950).
68. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 53. Under the equal division rule, when a plain-
tiff and defendant are both negligent, damages are equally divided. Therefore, if plaintiff suf-
fers $10,000 in damages due to his own and the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff recovers
$5000. This equal division occurs regardless of the relative degrees or percentages of negli-
gence of the parties. Even if the defendant could be regarded as 95% at fault, damages are
still divided equally. Id. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. The S.S. Royalton, 194 F. Supp. 543
(E.D. Mich. 1961).
69. SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 10. "Pure" comparative negligence reduces the con-
tributorily negligent plaintiff's damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to him. Id. at 46. For a complete examination of "pure" comparative negligence see infra
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The United States applied the equal division rule enunciated in the English
cases70 until 1975.71 The decisions applying the equal division rule may
have been America's first rough application of comparative fault.
While the equal division rule was being applied to maritime cases in
the United States courts, Congress, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, be-
gan enacting the first significant body of comparative fault legislation.7 2
These legislative enactments were in response to the common law fault sys-
tem's harsh treatment of injured workmen, especially railroad employees.73
The final enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 74 in
1908 provided that employees of interstate railroad carriers would not be
totally barred by their own negligence from bringing an action against their
employers.7 5 Instead, the employees' damages were to be diminished in pro-
portion to their own assessed negligence.71
Two other important developments in comparative negligence occurred
in the United States in 1920 when Congress enacted the Jones Act77 and
the Death on the High Seas Act.78 Both statutes incorporated pure compar-
ative negligence principles to protect seamen suffering physical injury or
death in the course of their employment.79 These statutes remain in force
today.80
In addition to the federal movement toward adoption of comparative
notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
70. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 169 (1854).
71. In 1975 the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975), abrogated the equal division rule in U.S. Maritime Law replacing the rule with pure
comparative negligence. The Court concluded that the equal division rule had prevailed by
"sheer inertia" and its ease of application was far outweighed by the unjust results it created.
Id. at 410.
72. SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 11. These initial laws were essentially applicable to
personal injury actions. Id.
73. Prosser, supra note 28, at 475-79. The common law's trilogy of defenses, contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule, led to demands for modifica-
tion or abolition of the fault system of liability which completely barred the plaintiff's recovery
if the plaintiff was found negligent. Id.
74. Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66, 45
U.S.C.A. § 51. The original FELA, enacted in 1906, was invalidated by Howard v. Illinois
Central Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1907), on grounds that the Act exceeded Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 503.
75. 45 U.S.C.A. § 53.
76. Id.
77. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
78. Act of March 30, 1920, ch. 111, § 6, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C.A. § 766.
79. See generally Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, et. seq. and Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 766, et. seq..
80. For application of the Jones Act see Caddy v. Texaco, Inc., 363 Mass. 36, 292
N.E.2d 348 (1973). For the Death on the High Seas Act see Nutt v. Loomis Hydraulic Test-
ing Co., 552 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977).
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negligence in the late 1800s, a few states had also become disenchanted
with the harsh all-or-nothing results occasioned by the contributory negli-
gence rule, and began to apply comparative negligence. Illinois, among the
first states to apply comparative negligence principles, adopted a system
which allowed a plaintiff to recover if his "negligence was comparatively
slight and the defendant's gross in comparison." ' The effect of this com-
parative negligence scheme was to shift the entire burden of fault to the
defendant if the plaintiff's negligence was comparatively slight. Illinois' ap-
plication of comparative negligence, however, was not consistent. In 1894,
Illinois reverted.back to contributory negligence, 2 but, in 1981, again ac-
cepted comparative negligence, this time in its pure form.88 Finally, in
1986, the Illinois legislature passed a statute replacing pure comparative
negligence with modified comparative negligence."4
Concern about the extreme harm caused to railroad employees by the
railroad industry prompted Georgia, in 1863, to abrogate contributory neg-
ligence in favor of comparative negligence.8 ' The Georgia Code provided
for a diminution of damages if a plaintiff was negligently injured by rail-
road operations.8 6 In 1913, the Georgia Supreme Court expanded the rail-
road statute to encompass a general comparative negligence system for the
entire state.8 7 In a related case, 8 the Georgia Supreme Court added the 49
percent rule of modified comparative negligence 8 requiring damages to be
apportioned according to fault unless the plaintiff's negligence was equal to
or greater than the negligence of the defendant.8 0 As one commentator
81. Galena & Chicago Union Ry. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858). Prior to Jacobs the
Illinois Supreme Court had adopted contributory negligence in The Aurora Branch R.R. v.
Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852).
The method adopted in Jacobs is known as the slight-gross method of comparative negli-
gence. For more complete treatment of the slight-gross method see infra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text.
82. City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.W. 892 (1894). "The law of com-
parative negligence is no longer the law of this court." Id. at 164, 38 N.E. at 893.
83. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). Pure comparative negligence
takes into account the negligence of all persons involved in the occurrence and reduces a plain-
tiff's recovery in direct proportion to his own fault. See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying
text.
84. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 2-1116 (1986). For full treatment of modified comparative
negligence see infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
85. Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Winn, 19 Ga. 440 (1856). See also SCHWARTZ, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 66, at 12.
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-8-291 (Supp. 1983). This diminution of damages worked
generally in the same manner as pure comparative fault to reduce a plaintiff's recovery. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 12.
87. Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913).
88. Christian v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 120 Ga. 314, 47 S.E. 923 (1904).
89. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
90. 47 S.E. at 923.
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noted, "[t]he court thus inadvertently laid the groundwork for the majority
of comparative negligence statutes of general application in the United
States today."""
Soon after Illinois and Georgia adopted their original comparative neg-
ligence schemes, a few other states followed, led by Tennessee in 1879 and
Florida in 1897.92 In addition, in 1910 Mississippi enacted a pure compara-
tive negligence statute which applied to all negligence actions, not merely
industrial accidents.9 3 In 1931, Wisconsin enacted legislation implementing
modified comparative negligence patterned after FELA and state legislation
which protected railroad workers. 4 In contrast to the original Georgia stat-
ute, the Wisconsin statute applied to all injured plaintiffs, not merely rail-
road workers, because citizens were now "pitted against complex machines
driven by steam [and] electricity." 95 Aside from these states, only Ne-
braska, South Dakota,98 and Arkansas97 adopted any form of comparative
negligence until the reform movement of the late 1960s. 98
Judicial9 and legislative'"0 support in favor of abrogating the contribu-
tory negligence doctrine910 increased markedly in the late 1960s and early
91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 12.
92. These statutes were also enacted to impose comparative negligence in actions
against railroad companies. I Rhodes, supra note 35, at 1-12. The Florida statute provided
that: "If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault the former may
recover; but the damages shall be diminished by the jury trying the case, in proportion to the
amount of fault attributable to him." 1897 Florida Laws ch. 3744, § 1. This statute was de-
clared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds in Georgia So. & Florida Ry. Co. v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
93. SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 18-19. Now MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972). The
Act was extended in 1920 to include actions for damage to property.
94. Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 5 (1931).
95. Id.
96. Nebraska in 1913, and South Dakota in 1941, adopted the slight-gross form of
comparative negligence. NEB. REV. STAT. 25-21, 183 1943, § 25-1151. S.D. CODIFIED, § 20-9-
2 (1978).
97. Ark. Acts 1955, No. 191, codified as ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-64-122 (1979) (Cum.
Supp. 1983) (pure form).
98. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
99. Between 1969 and 1988 eleven states have adopted some form of comparative neg-
ligence by judicial action. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab.
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (California); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (Florida); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984)
(Kentucky); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979)
(Michigan); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (Missouri); Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (New Mexico).
On the merits of judicial or legislative adoption of comparative negligence, see generally
Wade, supra note 17.
100. Since 1969 twenty-seven states have adopted comparative negligence by legislative
enactment. See generally Alvis v. Ribar, 85 I1l. 2d 1, 12-14, 421 N.E.2d 898, 91-2 (1981).
101. See supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
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1970s, culminating in perhaps one of the largest reform movements in mod-
ern legal history. By 1988, forty-five states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands had adopted some form of comparative negligence, 0 2 and of those
forty-five, thirty-eight had adopted the doctrine between 1969 and 1988.103
C. Forms of Comparative Negligence
As the doctrine of comparative negligence developed in the United
States, three main forms of apportioning fault emerged. One method, the
pure form of comparative negligence, takes into account the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence and reduces the plaintiff's award in direct proportion
to the total fault. 104 Under the second form, modified comparative negli-
gence, or the 50 percent system, contributory negligence of a plaintiff will
not bar recovery as long as the amount of the plaintiff's fault remains below
a fixed level in comparison with that of the defendant.105 The third well-
recognized method of comparative fault is the slight-gross system under
which a plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery unless his neg-
ligence is slight and the defendant's gross in comparison. 06 The pure and
modified approaches are the two methods most widely adopted in the
United States. Only three states follow the slight-gross system. 107
At present, thirteen states 08 have adopted pure comparative negli-
gence, six by legislative enactment'0 9 and seven by judicial decree.110 The
first state to enact a pure system was Mississippi, in 1910."' In states
adopting pure comparative negligence the amount of the plaintiff's recovery
depends on the degree of negligence directly attributable to him."12 There-
fore, a plaintiff is not barred from recovery unless he is 100 percent at
fault." 3 Criticism of the pure comparative negligence method centers on
the system's allowance of recovery to a plaintiff who may be 90 percent, 95
102. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 2-28.
103. See generally 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 2-28 - 57.
104. See, e.g., Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511
(1979); Buford v. Horne, 300 So. 2d 913 (Miss. 1974).
105. See, e.g., Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
106. See, e.g., Urban v. Wait's Supermarket, Inc., 294 N.W.2d 793 (S.D. 1980); C.C.
Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers, 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272 (1977); Crab v. Wade, 84
S.D. 93, 167 N.W.2d 546 (1969).
107. Nebraska, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See generally I Rhodes, supra note 35,
at 2-28.
108. Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. Id.
109. Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. Id.
110. Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico. Id.
111. 1910 Miss. Laws 135. The act applied only to personal injury and death actions
initially, but was amended to include property damage actions in 1920. 1920 Miss. Laws 312.
112. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 2-3.
113. Id.
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percent, or even 99 percent negligent. "
Proponents of the pure system, however, note the system's simplicity of
application, especially since apportionment is made by the trier of fact.1 5
Application of the pure system is easier because juries calculate the per-
centage of negligence of each tortfeasor instead of ignoring non-parties.116
Another rationale advanced by those jurisdictions adopting the pure form of
comparative negligence concerns criticism of the arbitrary lines drawn by
the modified system.117 As the Supreme Court of Illinois noted when judi-
cially adopting pure comparative negligence in 1981,118 "[t]he pure form of
comparative negligence is the only system which truly apportions damages
according to the relative fault of the parties and, thus, achieves total jus-
tice."119 In contrast, critics contend that the pure comparative negligence
method favors the parties who have incurred the most damage regardless of
their degree of negligence.120
The second method of comparative negligence is the modified, or 50
114. As stated by the West Virginia Supreme Court when adopting modified compara-
tive negligence in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979), "[it is
difficult, on theoretical grounds alone, to rationalize a system which permits a party who is
95% at fault to have his day in court as a plaintiff because he is 5% fault free." Id. at 883.
115. See generally Prosser, supra note 28. See also Turk, supra note 67.
116. See Smith and Wade, Fairness: A Comparative Analysis of the Indiana and Uni-
form Comparative Fault Acts, 17 IND. L. REV. 969, 980 (1984). ("Adopting full loss alloca-
tion would also equalize the burden of litigating the liability of absent parties . . ").
117. Modified comparative negligence bars recovery for a plaintiff who is 49% or 50%
negligent. Once the 49% or 50% threshold of contributory negligence by a plaintiff is reached,
the plaintiff will be totally barred from recovery. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying
text.
See also Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 136, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520
(1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
118. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Il1. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). However, in 1986 the Illinois
legislature statutorily rejected pure comparative negligence in favor of a modified system. ILL.
REV. STAT. Ch. 110, § 2-1116 (Supp. 1986).
A similar set of events occurred in Iowa, judicially adopting pure comparative negligence
in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1983), which was legislatively modified in
1984 by the state legislature who adopted a 50% system. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West
1985).
119. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Il1. 2d 1, 27, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (1981).
120. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va. 1979). This fa-
voritism is set out in an example by Easterday, supra note 36, at 884. To illustrate, consider a
plaintiff, twenty percent at fault and suffering $100,000 in damages, and a defendant, eight
percent at fault who has suffered only $10,000 in damages. Under the pure form the plaintiff
would recover eight percent of his damages or $80,000. However, suppose it was the defendant
who had suffered the $100,000 in damages and the plaintiff who had suffered only $10,000 in
damages. The plaintiff would still recover eight percent of his damages, or $8,000, but the
defendant, assuming he counterclaimed, would be able to recover from the plaintiff twenty
percent of his damages or $20,000. This result seems unfair, say the proponents of the modi-
fied system, and fear a plaintiff may be reluctant to file suit against a defendant, even though
that defendant is eight percent at fault.
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percent system of comparative negligence. This system contains two forms
of modified comparative negligence: the 50 percent, or "not greater than"
form; and, the 49 percent, or the "not as great as" form.1"1 Today, modified
comparative negligence has become the law in a majority of states. By
1988, twenty-nine states had adopted one of the two forms of modified com-
parative negligence. 1 2 Under these forms of comparative negligence, the
common law bar of contributory negligence is retained and is a complete
bar to recovery when a plaintiff's negligence exceeds a specified
threshold.12
The 50 percent rule, or the "not greater than" method of modified
comparative negligence, permits the plaintiff to recover provided that the
amount of the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the negligence of the
defendant. If a plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of the defendant, the
plaintiff cannot recover any damages. However, under the 50 percent form,
if the plaintiff's negligence is equal to the defendant's negligence, he may
still recover.12 Currently, twenty states follow the 50 percent rule.12 5
The other rule under the modified comparative negligence system is
the 49 percent rule, or the "not as great as" rule. As opposed to the 50
percent form where a plaintiff's recovery is barred when his negligence ex-
ceeds 50 percent, the 49 percent rule bars a plaintiff's recovery when his
negligence equals 50 percent or more. This system permits a plaintiff to
recover provided his share of the negligence is not as great as that of the
defendant.12 1 If the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the negligence of
the defendant the plaintiff takes nothing, as contributory negligence acts as
a complete bar to recovery once the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the 49
percent threshold. For example, if the plaintiff is 25 percent negligent and
suffers $10,000 in damages, and the defendant is 75 percent negligence and
suffers no damages, the plaintiff will recover 75 percent of his damages or
$7,500 because his negligence did not exceed the 49 percent threshold.
However, if the plaintiff is 75 percent negligent and suffers $10,000 in dam-
121. The 50% or "not greater than" form permits the plaintiff to recover provided the
amount of the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed the negligence of the defendant. The 49%,
or "not as great as" form, permits a plaintiff to recover provided his share of the negligence is
less than that of the defendant.
122. Those states employing the 50% rule are: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The
states following the 49 % rule are: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North
Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. See generally I Rhodes, supra note 35, at 2-28.
123. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 2-15.
124. Id. at 2-18.
125. For a listing of these states, see supra note 122. For application of the 50% rule,
see Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).
126. SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 76.
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ages, and the defendant is 25 percent negligent and suffers no damages, the
plaintiff will be completely barred from recovery since the 49 percent
threshold has been exceeded. Nine states currently follow this approach to
modified comparative negligence.127
While at first glance the logic behind the two rules may appear similar,
there is an essential distinction between them. The fundamental difference
is that the 50 percent rule permits a negligent plaintiff to recover from an
equally negligent defendant, while the 49 percent rule does not permit re-
covery unless the plaintiff's negligence is less than that of the defendant.
According to the proponents of the 49 percent rule, this difference is essen-
tial because no person should be permitted to recover from another who is
not more at fault.12 8
Even though a majority of states which operate under some form of
comparative negligence follow a modified system, that system has been
widely criticized. Dean Prosser has characterized the modified form as a
political compromise adopted by courts or legislatures that were unable to
obtain support for the "more desirable" pure form."29 In addition, the Su-
preme Court of California noted that modified comparative negligence sim-
ply shifts "the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a differ-
ent ground."" 0 This criticism stems from the fact that the modified versions
retain a 49 percent or 50 percent arbitrary threshold amount of contribu-
tory negligence which, when exceeded, totally bars recovery. 3'
127. See, e.g., Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
128. 1 Rhodes, supra note 35, at 2-18. An example of a 49% statute is demonstrated by
Arkansas. ARK. STATS. ANN. § 16-64-122 (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides:
If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is of less degree than the fault
chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover dam-
ages, then the claiming party is entitled to recover the amount of his damages after they
have been diminished in proportion to the degree of his own fault. If the fault chargeable
to a party claiming damages is equal to or greater in degree than any fault chargeable to
the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the
claiming party is too entitled to recover such damages.
Id.
Minnesota's comparative negligence statute exemplifies the 50% rule. MINN. STATS.
ANN. § 604.01 subd. I (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides:
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for fault resulting in death or injury to person or prop-
erty, if the contributory fault was not greater than the fault of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of fault attributable to the person recovering.
Id.
129. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. Rav. 1, 16-17 (1953).
130. Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 874 (1975).
131. See, e.g., Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977). "The rule
preventing recovery if plaintiff's negligence exceeds 50 % of the total fault is just as arbitrary
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The third form of comparative negligence, sometimes also considered
to be a form of modified comparative negligence, is the slight-gross method.
This form of comparative negligence is applied in different variations in
three states.132 The slight-gross method places a more onerous burden on
plaintiffs since, in order to recover, the plaintiff's negligence must be slight
in amount and the defendant's gross in comparison.1 33 In addition, the small
number of jurisdictions opting for the slight-gross rule is evidence of the
rule's unattractiveness. As Dean Prosser notes, the rule "leaves the damages
undivided in too many cases . . and lead[s] inevitably to ...
confusion."" 4
In addition to controversy over the correct form of comparative negli-
gence to be used in determining fault assessment, or the "how should fault
be assessed" question, many states are split over the method employed to
apportion the fault, or the "to whom should fault be assessed" question.
This question is considered in the next section.
III. FAULT APPORTIONMENT To NON-PARTY TORTFEASORS
A. Approaches to Fault
While the answer to the question of "to whom should fault be appor-
tioned" seems clear when the question involves only one plaintiff and one
defendant, the apportionment question becomes increasingly difficult when
there are multiple defendants and one or more of those multiple defendants
are unknown non-parties."35 The method of distributing the fault of a non-
as that which completely denies recovery. Is the person who is 49% negligent that much more
deserving than the one who is 51 % negligent?" Id. at 642, 256 N.W.2d at 428.
132. Nebraska, South Dakota and Tennessee. For cases applying the slight-gross
method see supra note 106.
133. See, e.g., Hickman v. Parks Constr. Co., 162 Neb. 461, 76 N.W.2d 403 (1956).
The plaintiff's burden is more onerous under this approach because, since the plaintiff's
burden can only be "slight in comparison", the higher thresholds of the modified system and
the pure system will permit more negligence by an at fault plaintiff.
134. Prosser, supra note 28, at 508. For extended treatment of the slight-gross rule and
all forms of comparative negligence, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 43-82, and Supp. 1981.
135. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2 (1)(a) defines a non-party to mean "a person who is, or
may be, liable to the claimant in part or in whole for the damages claimed but who has not
been joined in the action as a defendant by the claimant. A nonparty shall not include the
employer of the claimant."
This definition of a non-party can include a tortfeasor who is absent for many reasons.
First, a non-party can be one who has settled out of court with the plaintiff prior to trial. Also,
a non-party may be one who is immune from suit as when a passenger is injured by the driver
of an automobile and the driver is immune due to a guest statute. Finally, a non-party can
include a defendant who is beyond jurisdiction and service of process. This note will focus on
the non-party tortfeasor who is unidentifiable or a "phantom" defendant. For full treatment of
the non-party tortfeasors briefly described in this footnote, see generally Eilbacher, Compara-
tive Fault and the Nonparty Tortfeasor, 17 IND. L. REV. 903 (1984).
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party tortfeasor has a significant impact on the recovery of injured plaintiffs
and the culpability of negligent defendants.18 At present, two main ap-
proaches are employed to apportion fault.13 Under the limited approach,
apportionment of fault will be made only to those persons who are actually
made parties to the action.'88 By contrast, the unlimited approach requires
apportionment of fault to all individuals or entities involved in the occur-
rence, including unknown non-parties." 9
1. The Limited Approach
Several states and two model statutes follow the limited approach. 4"
This approach ignores the fault of the absent tortfeasor, limiting compari-
son of fault to the parties to the lawsuit.' Presumably, the result of this
approach is to shift the absent tortfeasor's liability to the remaining defend-
ants and to any plaintiff at fault . 4  For example, in National Farmers
Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Frackelton,14 1 the plaintiff suffered
severe electrical burns while working at the defendant's job site.' 44 The
plaintiff named only a power company as the defendant, inadvertently fail-
ing to name a co-worker who was largely responsible for the plaintiff's in-
jury.' 45 In weighing the competing interests in the two main methods of
fault apportionment"4 the court determined that fault should be limited to
136. See, e.g., Larsen v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 120 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 355
N.W.2d 557, 564 (1984). "Were the judgment not modified, one defendant would bear a lia-
bility resulting from the causal negligence attributed by the jury to the immune and nonparty
defendants." See also National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983). "[A] comparison of the negligence of absent tortfeasors may
work to defeat any recovery by a deserving plaintiff." See generally Eilbacher, supra note 135,
at 904-05 n.2 (1984); See also Berg, Comparative Contribution and Its Alternatives, 43 INs.
CoUNs. J. 577, 587-88 (1976); Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation
in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 LA. L. REv. 373, 387-88 (1980).
137. See generally Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 903; Fleming, supra note 191, at 241;
Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 445 (1984-85).
138. See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
140. For purposes of this Note, this method will be termed the limited approach since
fault apportionment is limited to the parties to the action. See generally Smith and Wade,
supra note 116, at 979.
141. For cases apportioning fault according to this method see, e.g., National Farmers
Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983); and see also
Sugue v. F.L. Smithe Machine Co., 56 Hawaii 598, 546 P.2d 527 (1976), overruled by Es-
paniola v. Candrey Mars Joint Venture, 707 P.2d 365 (Hawaii 1985).
142. Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort
Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Assoc. v. Superior Court, 30
HAsTINGs L.J. 1465, 1494 (1979).
143. 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983).
144. Id. at 1057.
145. Id.
146. The court stated that the rule requiring allocation of fault to both parties to the
1989]
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the parties to the action, because a comparison of the negligence of an ab-
sent tortfeasor would work to defeat recovery by a deserving plaintiff. 47
The court noted, however, that in limiting fault assessment only to parties
to the action, the defendant might be prejudiced by having to bear the bur-
den of the non-party's fault. The court stated that "defendants in particular
may not wish to risk. . . liability for the plaintiff's losses with slight hopes
of recovering." 14
In addition to the reasons noted in Frackelton, advocates of the limited
approach advance several reasons for limiting apportionment of fault to
parties to the action. Initially, supporters of this approach claim that juries
have difficulty including a non-party in the fault apportionment scheme. 149
The second argument advanced by those favoring exclusion of non-parties
from fault allocation is that the apportionment of fault cannot bind a party
because of res judicata principles. 150 Proponents of the limited approach
also argue that determining a non-party's percentage of fault would be "fu-
tile."'15' Furthermore, proponents of limiting fault allocation to the parties
to the action note that excluding non-parties encourages joinder,152 as "the
more parties joined whose fault contributed to the injury, the smaller the
percentage of fault allocated to each of the other parties."'153 Finally, exclu-
action and also to non-parties is based upon the premise that comparison should be made
among all parties at fault in the occurrence; that such a rule promotes bringing all such parties
into the action as parties to the lawsuit; and that settlement is encouraged.
In addition, the court noted that the rule limiting allocation to the parties to the litigation
is supported by arguments that a comparison of the negligence of absent tortfeasors may de-
feat recovery by a deserving plaintiff, and it is unfair to saddle the plaintiff with the burden of
litigating liability issues of a non-party, especially when the non-party cannot be bound by res
judicata principles. Id. at'1061-62.
147. Id. at 1061.
148. Id. at 1060.
149. The Commissioner's Comment to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act makes it
clear that the limited approach supporters feel juries would have a difficult time assessing fault
to non-parties. As the Comment notes:
"The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons who may have been
at fault with regard to the particular injury but who have not been joined as parties. This is a
deliberate decision. It cannot be told with certainty whether that person was actually at fault
or what amount of fault should be attributed to him." (Emphasis added). Unif. Comp. Fault
Act, § 2, Commissioner's Comment, 12 U.L.A. 35 (1984).
150. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Property Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056,
1062-63 (Colo. 1983). "Collateral estoppel cannot be applied to the disadvantage of a person
who has not litigated the issue in question. It was error for the trial court to bind Frackelton in
a declaratory judgment action to the jury's findings of relative fault in the prior action to
which he was not a party." See also Comment, supra note 25, at 95.
151. Unif. Comp. Fault Act, § 2, Commissioner's Comment, 12 U.L.A. 35 (1984).
152. Sobelsohn, supra note 137, at 451. Generally, joinder is joining additional persons
as parties to the same proceeding.
153. Unif. Comp. Fault Act, § 2, Commissioner's Comment, 12 U.L.A. 35 (1984).
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sion of non-parties is said to be justified on joint and several liability154 and
contribution " principles. A defendant who assumes the full share of the
absent tortfeasor's fault may eventually be able to recover the absent
tortfeasor's share under either joint and several liability or contribution
principles.156
2. The Unlimited Approach
The unlimited approach 57 includes the absent tortfeasor in the alloca-
tion of fault, apportioning the fault among all persons who legally caused
the plaintiff's harm.158 Advocates of the unlimited approach say that to
achieve complete fault assessment "all tortfeasors must be named in the
apportionment question, and their negligence be percentaged so that the
total negligence of 100 percent can be determined.""5 9 This approach is ra-
tional, the proponents say, because each person's negligence is his own neg-
ligence and "should not be shifted to some other tortfeasor who participated
in the occurrence just because such tortfeasor is a party."16
Proponents of the unlimited approach make several arguments in favor
154. Under principles of joint and several liability, each wrongdoer is individually re-
sponsible for the entire judgment, and the person harmed can collect from one wrongdoer or
from all of them together until the judgment is satisfied. For treatment of joint and several
liability under comparative fault see generally Eilbacher, supra note 135.
155. Under principles of contribution a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered
is entitled to recover a proportionate share of the judgment from other joint tortfeasors whose
negligence contributed to the injury.
156. See Sobelsohn, supra note 137, at 454.
157. For purposes of this Note, this method will be termed the unlimited approach since
fault apportionment includes all persons who contribute to the plaintiff's harm. See generally
Smith and Wade, supra note 116.
158. See generally Heft and Heft, Controversial Concepts Within Comparative Negli-
gence, 1982 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 49, 52. "But the search is for the truth - and the percent-
age of liability of all tortfeasors, parties or not, are necessary to consider before the truth can
be determined."
See also Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579, cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Bowman v. Barnes, 168 W.Va. 111, 282 S.E.2d
613 (W. Va. 1981); Paul v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1980); Brown v. Keill,
224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
159. Heft and Heft, supra note 158, at 52. See also Connar v. West Shore Equipment
Co., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975), "The apportionment must include all whose
negligence may have contributed to creating the cause of action whether parties or not." Id. at
45, 227 N.W.2d at 660.
160. Heft and Heft, supra note 158, at 52. See also Kirby Bldg. Systems v. Mineral
Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985).
Or, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court so aptly put it in Paul v. N.L. Industries, 624 P.2d
68 (Okla. 1980), "To limit the jury to viewing the negligence of only one tortfeasor and then
ask it to apportion that negligence to the overall wrong is to ask it to judge a forest by observ-
ing one tree. It cannot, and more important should not, be done."
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of apportioning fault among all persons who legally caused the plaintiff's
harm. First, allocating fault to all responsible parties eliminates or reduces
any difficulty a jury may have in apportioning fault while ignoring someone
who obviously shares in the blame for the accident.""' Secondly, proponents
argue that including the non-party tortfeasor in the fault apportionment
scheme encourages settlement 62 among the remaining identifiable parties.
Also, including the non-party tortfeasor may fix the maximum amount of
recovery in the original action against the unidentifiable party in any subse-
quent action for contribution. 6 3
Finally, determining which remaining party has assumed the share of
the unjoined tortfeasor and therefore who should retain a subsequent cause
of action against the non-party tortfeasor is far more complex if the jury
ignores allocating fault to the non-party in the original action.'" In rela-
tion, it is said that no one knows to whom the jury has assigned the share of
fault of the non-party tortfeasor.'15
Professor Sobelsohn notes that "neither approach escapes difficulty"166
and that the most equitable result is to apportion the fault of the absent
tortfeasor among the remaining tortfeasors on a proportionate basis accord-
ing to their assessed percentage of liability, 67 sometimes termed the "ratio
161. Sobelsohn, supra note 137, at 447. See also Kirby Bldg. Systems v. Mineral Explo-
rations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). "If the objective or purpose of the statutory change
from common law contributory negligence to comparative negligence was to apportion dam-
ages according to fault, the same is completely lost in those instances involving multiple de-
fendants when one of the defendants must bear damages [of the non-party defendant] com-
pletely beyond his fault." Id. at 1279. (Rooney, J., dissenting).
162. Sobelsohn, supra note 137, at 447.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 448. See also National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Frack-
elton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983). "Plaintiffs and defendants may not wish to litigate because
of the effect on the jury of the unknown factor of absent tortfeasors." Id. at 1060.
165. Id.
166. Sobelsohn, supra note 137, at 446.
167. See, e.g., Larsen v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 120 Wis. 2d 508, 355 N.W.2d
557 (1984), disapproved by C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988).
Were the judgment not modified, one defendant would bear a liability resulting from the
causal negligence attributed by the jury to the immune and nonparty defendants. This
inequitable distribution of damages would be inconsistent with the basic premise . . .
that no defendant should bear 'an unequal proportion of the common burden.' The 55%
negligence attributed to the immune and nonparty defendants must be divided according
to the proportion of the remaining [defendants].
Id. at 520-21, 355 N.W.2d at 564. See also Fleming, supra note 142, at 1492. Fleming notes
that the only sound solution is to distribute the shortfall of non-party fault among the solvent
parties, plaintiff as well as defendants, in proportion to the respective share of fault. He notes
further that many scholars, common law countries and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
advocate the proportionate approach. However, it appears that if a state is to adopt this ap-
proach, fault assessment would have to take into account the non-party in fault assessment to
determine the non-party's share of liability to be reapportioned.
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approach."' 6
IV. COMPARATIVE FAULT IN INDIANA
A. Legislative History
Indiana's movement toward adoption of comparative fault began in the
state legislature in 1973.169 However, no bill received serious consideration
until 1981 when a "pure" comparative fault proposal1 70 was introduced
based on the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act.' 7 1 The 1981 bill
progressed only as far as a committee hearing.272 In 1983, a modified com-
parative fault bill attracted substantial support in the legislature, passing
both houses by overwhelming margins.273  The new legislation was codified
under Indiana Code Chapter 33, and is known as the Indiana Comparative
Fault Act.17
4
Several reasons have been cited by Indiana legislators for abrogating
the traditional contributory negligence rule in favor of adopting a compara-
tive fault scheme.Y75 Initially, legislators noted that abrogation of contribu-
tory negligence is more equitable to the plaintiff who is slightly at fault, 76
because, under comparative fault, a plaintiff who is only 5 percent at fault
168. Chamallas, supra note 136, at 390. See also Wilkins, Indiana's Comparative Fault
Act at A First (Lingering) Glance, 17 IND. L. REV. 687, 719 (1984). "If the equitable reappor-
tionment system suggested in the previous discussion is adopted, for example, it could not be
fully effective without an amendment of the [Indiana Comparative Fault] Act expressly per-
mitting contribution."
169. H.B. 1680 and 1771, 98th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1973). Neither bill made it
out of the House Judiciary Committee, 1973 House Journal 1893, 1907, as reported in Bayliff,
Drafting and Legislative History of the Comparative Fault Act, 17 IND. L. REv. 863 (1984).
In Lewis v. Mackley, 122 Ind. App. 247, 99 N.E.2d 442 (1951), plaintiff's dependent was
killed when the car he was driving collided with the defendant's milk truck. In applying the
contributory negligence rule and denying recovery to the plaintiff the appellate court expressly
ruled that Indiana did not recognize comparative negligence. Id. at 253, 99 N.E.2d at 443.
170. H.B. 2054, 102nd Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1981).
171. Unif. Comp. Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 35 (1984).
172. Ind. House and Senate Journal Index 220 (1981) as reported in Bayliff, supra note
169, at 863. As Bayliff notes, "Lobbyists representing insurance company interests stoutly
opposed the 1981 bill. They were especially concerned with the prospect of plaintiffs and de-
fendants both being able to recover in the same action." Id. at 863.
173. Id. The Act passed the House 78-12, and the Senate 41-6.
174. Indiana's Act is framed in terms of comparative "fault" rather than comparative
"negligence". Comparative "fault" encompasses more than negligence actions and contribu-
tory negligence defenses. It covers strict liability, warranty, and wilful and wanton misconduct
actions as well as defenses based upon assumption of risk, incurred risk, misuse, unreasonable
failure to avoid injury, and failure to mitigate damages. However, the method of fault appor-
tionment is generally the same. See Yosha, supra note 4, at 416.
175. Contributory negligence was applied to bar recovery in Indiana as late as 1987. See
Howard v. H.J. Ricks Construction Co., 509 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
176. Becker, supra note 3, at 881.
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can still recover from a defendant who is 95 percent at fault. By contrast,
under contributory negligence the plaintiff would be completely barred
from recovery.177 Also, many legislators felt that adoption of comparative
fault avoided the inequity under the contributory negligence rule of totally
barring recovery to deserving plaintiffs. 1 8 Furthermore, legislators noted
that they felt many juries ignored the contributory negligence rule or used
other devices such as the doctrine of last clear chance to avoid the rule's
harsh effects."7 9 Finally, Indiana legislators felt that enactment of a com-
parative fault system would provide more predictability, greater equity and
a restored sense of respect for the law. 80
B. Application of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act
The Indiana Comparative Fault Act applies the 50 percent, or "not
greater than," rule of modified comparative negligence. 81 Thus, the con-
tributory negligence doctrine is not totally abrogated under the Indiana
Act, but a claimant's contributory negligence will not bar recovery unless
the total contributory negligence exceeds the 50 percent threshold.' 8 ' The
Indiana Act is based on "fault" rather than negligence, and, therefore, en-
compasses a wider variety of conduct. 88
In addition, the Indiana Act encompasses statutorily what many states
have left to be resolved judicially.l& 4 Many of the Act's provisions explicitly
177. See, e.g., Hundt v. LaCrosse Grain Co., 446 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1983). In Hundt,
the plaintiff fell down basement stairs in an office building suffering severe injuries. The con-
tributory negligence rule applied to completely bar recovery. Id.; Urschel v. United States, 145
F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ind. 1956), where the plaintiff-farmer was injured when he put his hand
into a grain tank to get a handful of shelled corn to see if it was moldy and got his fingers
caught in the conveyor belt. The court held the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
and completely barred him from recovery. Id. at 285.
178. Becker, supra note 3. Representative Becker, one of the sponsors of the legislation,
noted, "By abolishing contributory negligence, legislators felt that juries would no longer be
forced to contrive ways to circumvent the harsh treatment of the sightly-at-fault plaintiff." Id.
at 881.
179. Becker, supra note 3, at 881. See also Fleming, supra note 19, at 243, where he
notes that compromising by juries led to a decline in respect and support for the contributory
negligence rule.
180. Becker, supra note 3, at 881.
181. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-4, supra note 2, "In an action based on fault ... the
claimant is barred from recovery if his contributory fault is greater than the fault of all per-
sons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages."
182. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5, supra note 2.
183. See supra note 174.
184. Compare the detail of the Indiana Act's provisions, supra note 2, with the entire
one paragraph statutes of Minnesota and Arkansas, supra note 128.
Compare Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983) (comparative fault inapplica-
ble to breach of warranty actions); Duff v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 103 Idaho 432, 649 P.2d
391 (1982), aft'd, 105 Idaho 123, 666 P.2d 650 (1983) (comparative fault applicable to breach
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denote whether the statute is applicable to certain tort actions."8 5 Determin-
ing whether the statute is applicable to certain tort actions provides for less
confusion in the courts and also leads to predictability of results. However,
in Indiana's rush to adopt a scheme of comparative fault"88 the Indiana
legislature left many questions regarding the new Act unresolved. 8 7 For
example, the statute does not consider how comparative fault principles
should apply in derivative cases, 8 nor does the Act address the issue of
of warranty actions), with IND CODE § 34-4-33-13 (Supp. 1988) "This chapter does not apply
in any manner to . . .breach of warranty actions."
185. See, e.g., IND CODE § 34-4-33-7 (Supp. 1988) "under this chapter, there is no right
of contribution among tortfeasors." See also IND. CODE § 34-4-33-8 (Supp. 1988) "This chap-
ter does not apply in any manner to tort claims against governmental entities or public em-
ployees." And, see, e.g., State v. Scheutter, 503 N.E.2d 418 (Ind. 1987) (state comparative
fault act is not applicable to tort claims against the state).
In addition, IND CODE § 34-4-33-13 (Supp. 1988) explicitly states that "This chapter
does not apply in any manner to strict liability actions under IND CODE § 33-1-1.5 (Products
Liability)." Other states have been left to resolve this question judicially. See, e.g., Zahrte v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980); Robinson v. Parker-Hannifin Corp.,
4 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 447 N.E.2d 781 (1982).
186. Bayliff, supra note 169, at 877, says, "As earlier mentioned the 'empty chair' or
'non-party' language of the Act was added at the eleventh hour before passage in 1983."
187. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence in Indiana: A Unique Statute That Will
Reshape the Law, 17 IND. L. REv. 957, 960 (1984). Professor Schwartz notes that a few of
the questions unaddressed by the legislature and in need of resolving are whether punitive
damages should still be awarded in cases of willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct; and,
whether the rule of joint and several liability is abolished.
In addition, another question left unresolved by the Act is whether the last clear chance
doctrine survives the enactment of comparative fault in Indiana. As recently as 1977, before
enactment of Indiana's comparative fault statute, Indiana still recognized the last clear chance
doctrine. See McKeown v. Clausa, 172 Ind. App. 1, 359 N.E.2d 550 (1977); Bates v.
Boughton, 151 Ind. App. 139, 278 N.E.2d 316 (1972). Since the Indiana Comparative Fault
Act fails to specifically address last clear chance the Indiana courts will be left to determine
whether the Act abrogates the doctrine of last clear chance. However, since it is thought that
the doctrine is aimed at the modification of the contributory negligence doctrine a strong argu-
ment can be made that under Indiana's comparative fault statute the last clear chance doc-
trine has been abrogated.
See also Pardieck, The Impact of Comparative Fault in Indiana, 17 IND. L. REV. 925,
929 (1984).
While Indiana's ...Act attempts to clarify what type of actions are within the
scope of the Act, it fails to mention a number of doctrines. Courts will eventually have to
decide whether doctrines not mentioned in the . . .Act are within its scope; the scope
and application of the Act will also have to be determined in regard to those areas specifi-
cally mentioned . . .The final word on the Act's scope and impact [will be] in the hands
of the judiciary.
Id.
188. Most jurisdictions apply comparative negligence to derivative causes. Generally, a
derivative action is where the negligence of the agent is imputed to the principal. See, e.g.,
Garrison v. Funderburk, 262 Ark. 711, 561 S.W.2d 73 (1978) (comparative negligence of
minor in possession of his mother's automobile was imputed to mother in her counterclaim for
damages).
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whether joint and several liability is abolished.189
Since the Act became effective in 1985, the most litigated issue under
the statute has centered on who can be defined as a non-party for purposes
of fault assessment.190 As amended in 1984, the Act includes a non-party
defense which allows a defendant to plead the negligence of a non-party.191
Within the context of the provision, it is the defendant's responsibility to
specially plead the defense within a specified time, and the defendant must
also affirmatively assert the possible negligence of the non-party. 92 In addi-
tion, after the defendant specially pleads the defense he is responsible for
proving the causal connection between the non-party's actions and the
plaintiff's damages at trial. 193 The effect of the non-party defense is to re-
duce the percentage of fault allocated to a defendant who specially pleads
the defense and who is successful in proving the causal fault of a non-party
at trial.' M If the defendant is successful, the result is generally a reduction
of plaintiff's recovery of damages.19 5 Before a defendant may attempt to
prove the causal fault of a non-party by specially pleading the non-party
defense, however, the alleged non-party must fall within the "non-party"
definition of the Act. 86 Conforming with the "non-party" definition has
caused considerable difficulty for many defendants. 97
The Indiana courts allow derivative causes of action in contributory negligence cases.
Bender v. Peay, 433 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
189. However, most commentators agree that the Indiana Act, while not expressly doing
so, effectively eliminates the joint and several liability doctrine. See generally Yosha, supra
note 4, at 416. See also Easterday, supra note 36, at 899.
190. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2 (Supp. 1988) defines a "nonparty" as "a person who is, or
may be, liable to the claimant in part or in whole for the damages claimed but who has not
been joined in the action as a defendant by the claimant." Id.
191. See IND. CODE § 34-4-3310(b) (Supp. 1988). "The burden of proof of a nonparty
defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the defense." Id.
192. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-10(c) (Supp. 1988). See also supra note 2 for the full text of
the non-party provision of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act.
193. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-10(b) (Supp. 1988). See also supra note 2 for the full text of
the non-party provisions of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act.
194. See generally Wilkins, supra note 168, at 734-35. See also Walters v. Dean, 497
N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
195. Id.
196. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2(a) (Supp. 1988). "'Nonparty' means a person who is, or
may be, liable to the claimant in part or in whole for the damages claimed but who has not
been joined in the action as a defendant by the claimant. A nonparty shall not include the
employer of the claimant." Id.
197. The Indiana courts' difficulty in defining who is a non-party under the Act is exem-
plified by two recent cases. In Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1987), the plain-
tiff was injured in a highway accident and instituted an action for negligence against the driver
of the truck who struck the plaintiff. The named defendant inspected the wreckage and later
determined that the state highway department might have been negligent in its maintenance of
the highway. Pursuant to this discovery, the defendant asked the court to join the state high-
way department as a non-party to be taken into account for fault assessment purposes. Before
[Vol. 23
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The Indiana statute provides somewhat of a solution to the question of
"to whom fault should be assessed." 198 Section Five of the Act instructs the
jury to determine the percentage of fault of all persons contributing to the
plaintiff's harm.199 In addition, this section instructs the jury that if the
plaintiff's fault exceeds 50 percent (the not greater than form of modified
comparative negligence) the plaintiff is barred from recovery. 00 The Act
does not determine whether the fault of a non-party should be taken into
consideration for fault allocation purposes if the defendant does not spe-
cially plead the non-party defense provided in section Ten of the Act.
However, this discrepancy in the Act has been clarified in the 1986
case of Walters v. Dean201 where an Indiana appellate court had to deter-
mine how to allocate fault in actions where a non-party was largely respon-
sible for the harm.20 2 In Walters, the non-party left the plaintiff's car unat-
tended on the side of the road. Subsequently, the defendant was injured
when his car collided with the plaintiff's vehicle.20 3 The plaintiff sued the
defendant for damage to his parked car, and the defendant counterclaimed
asserting the non-party was the sole cause of the collision.204 The precise
allowing the defendant to proceed with proving the fault of the state highway department as a
non-party, the court had to first determine whether the state highway department was a non-
party within the definition of "non-party" in the Comparative Fault Act. The court held that
the plaintiff would have had an action against the state if the time for filing a claim against
the state had not expired, and allowed the defendant to prove the fault of the state highway
department as a non-party. Id. at 511.
Also, in Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking Co., 659 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ind. 1987), an Indi-
ana court was again faced with the issue of determining whether certain state entities are non-
parties within the definition of "non-party" in the Indiana Comparative Fault Act. Specifi-
cally, the court had to determine whether separate state entities were "employers" of workers
of other state entities within the definition of "non-party" in the Indiana Act.
In Hill, two employees of the Indiana State Highway Department were summoned to an
accident scene on the Indiana Toll Road. While working in a lane closed to traffic, a tractor
trailer driven by the defendant struck and killed one employee and seriously injured the other.
The defendants alleged as non-parties the fault of two state entities: the Indiana State Police
and the State Department of Highways. The court held that the legislature did not define
"employer" to include all persons in the same employment as the plaintiff due to the ambigu-
ity which would result. The court did not allow the State Police or the Department of High-
ways to be taken into account for fault assessment purposes. Id. at 434.
198. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5 (Supp. 1988), outlining the 50% method, and IND.
CODE § 34-4-33-10 (Supp. 1988) making it a party-defendant's responsibility to specially
plead the non-party defense.
199. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5 (Supp. 1988). "In an action based on fault. . . [t]he jury
shall determine the percentage of fault of the claimant, of the defendant, and of any person
who is a non-party."
200. Id. "If the percentage of fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent 50% of
the total fault involved in the incident . . . the jury shall return a verdict for the defendant."
201. 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
202. Id. at 253.
203. Id. at 249.
204. Id.
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question on appeal was whether, under Indiana law, the fault of a non-party
was to be considered in all cases or only in those cases where the non-party
defense is specially pleaded by the defendant under the non-party defense
provision of the Act.2" 5 After reviewing the two main approaches to fault
allocation206 the court declared that,
The Indiana legislature has adopted a middle-ground position
between the two competing viewpoints concerning allocation of
non-party fault. It is our opinion that allocation of non-party
fault is to be made only in those cases where the non-party de-
fense is specially pleaded by a named defendant. Otherwise, al-
location of fault is to be limited to the parties to the action.""
The Indiana Comparative Fault Act is unique in that it is the first
comparative fault legislation which addresses statutorily the involvement of
the non-party tortfeasor in the apportionment scheme.20 8 By limiting alloca-
tion of fault to the parties to the action if the non-party defense is not
specially pleaded by a named defendant, Indiana is the only state which
gives the defendant who can identify the non-party tortfeasor a choice be-
tween the two competing approaches of fault allocation. If a named defend-
ant specially pleads the non-party defense, and can name a non-party, fault
will be allocated to the named non-party according to the unlimited ap-
proach.20 1 However, if the named defendant does not specially plead the
non-party defense, fault allocation is limited to the parties to the action,210
and fault will be assessed according to the limited approach.1 This ration-
ale has found support among commentators on the Indiana Comparative
Fault Act.212
However, while the court in Walters212 and the commentators on the
Indiana Comparative Fault Act seem to have sound reasoning within the
context of the Act, one question remains unaddressed by the Indiana legis-
lature and has only recently been addressed by one Indiana court.2 14 How
205. Id. at 253.
206. Id. at 252. See also supra notes 135-68 and accompanying text.
207. 497 N.E.2d at 253.
208. Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 904-05 n.2; See also Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking
Co., 659 F. Supp. 430, 432 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
209. See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
210. See generally Walters v. Dean, 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
211. Id.
212. Wilkins, supra note 168, at 739. See also Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 921-22.
Indeed, Eilbacher suggests that when the non-party defense is not specially pleaded, fault allo-
cation must be limited to the parties to the action to avoid a mistrial. Id. at 921. See also
Walters v. Dean, 497 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
213. 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
214. See Cornell Harbison Excavating, Inc. v. May, 530 N.E.2d 771 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988), and infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
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will the allocation of fault be assessed to unidentifiable or "phantom" non-
party tortfeasors who may not be able to be specially pleaded by "name"
within the non-party defense of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act?2 15
Thus, the crucial issue to be considered is what will sufficiently constitute
"naming" an unidentifiable non-party tortfeasor.
V. THE INDIANA COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT: WHAT'S IN A "NAME"?
Since the issue of what will sufficiently constitute "naming" an uniden-
tifiable non-party tortfeasor for purposes of fault assessment under the Indi-
ana Comparative Fault Act has not been addressed thus far by the Indiana
legislature, and has only recently been addressed by one Indiana court, the
problem may continue to be resolved by either the courts, in a variety of
ways, or by the legislature through amendment to the Act. However, con-
tinued judicial resolution of this issue will lead to inconsistency and judicial
speculation of legislative intent. Therefore, the most sound approach is for
legislative resolution of the problem by amendment to the Indiana Compar-
ative Fault Act.
A. Solving the "Name" Problem by Judicial Interpretation
As previously indicated 16 the Indiana Comparative Fault Act requires
a party defendant to specially plead the fault of the non-party by affirma-
tively asserting the non-party defense under section Ten of the Act in order
for fault to be assessed to a tortfeasor who is not a party to the action.
However, this section has no requirement that the non-party be "named"
before taken into account for fault assessment purposes. 17 In addition,
while section Six of the Act defines a non-party as one who is, or may be
liable, to the claimant, but has not yet been joined in the action as a de-
fendant by the claimant21 8 the Act also requires the jury to disclose the
name of the non-party on the jury verdict form if fault is to be allocated to
215. An example will illustrate how this will occur. For instance, assume that, in the
Walters case, the non-party, Andrew, had stolen the plaintiff's car, was unknown, and could
not be found. In the answer, the defendant attempts to specially plead the non-party defense,
under section Ten of the Comparative Fault Act, naming "the unknown driver who abandoned
the stolen car on the shoulder of the road." However, since under IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6, the
jury "shall name" the non-party to whom they are assessing fault, the question arises as to
what it means to "name" the non-party. Is "the unknown driver who abandoned the stolen car
on the shoulder of the road" sufficient for naming the non-party for fault assessment purposes?
See Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 41 Wis. 2d 661, 165 N.W.2d 162
(1969). See also infra notes 216-88 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
217. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-10 (Supp. 1988), supra note 2.
218. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2 (Supp. 1988), supra note 2.
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the non-party. 1 The question thus arises as to what will sufficiently consti-
tute "naming" an unidentifiable non-party tortfeasor to satisfy the Act's
verdict form name requirement in order that fault may be assessed by the
jury to the non-party tortfeasor.
This analysis involves a two-part inquiry. The threshold question is
whether the defendant must identify with specificity the non-party when
pleading the non-party defense under section Ten of the Act. The second
part of the inquiry is what will be a sufficient "naming" of the non-party to
satisfy the requirement in section Six of the Act that the jury name the
non-party. The two questions are closely related. These questions are
unique to the Indiana Comparative Fault Act since no other state has the
requirement that the jury disclose the name of the non-party on the jury
verdict form.220
In addressing these questions, the court may proceed in three principal
ways. First, the court may accept a defendant's assertion of the "unidentifi-
able driver of the red car" as sufficiently identifying the non-party for pur-
poses of specially pleading the non-party defense. Secondly, the court may
incorporate by analogy the reasoning and policies underlying the doctrine
which prohibits recovery by a motorist from a "phantom" or hit-and-run
driver under the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy. Fi-
nally, the court can focus on the language of the Indiana Act.
Initially, the court may accept a defendant's assertion of the "uniden-
219. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6 (Supp. 1988). "If the evidence in the action is sufficient to
support the charging of fault to a non-party, the form of verdict also shall require a disclosure
of the name of the nonparty and the percentage of fault charged to the nonparty." Id.
220. See, e.g., VERMONT STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any plaintiff, or his legal
representative, to recover damages for negligence resulting in death, personal injury or prop-
erty damage, if the negligence was not greater than the causal total negligence of the defend-
ant or defendants, but the damages shall be diminished by general verdict in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. Where recovery is allowed against more than
one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of
causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.
Id.
See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985).
In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries have resulted
in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the prop-
erty, or person having control over the property may not have been in the exercise of due care
shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the finder of fact in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the property or
person having control over the property.
Notice that neither statute, Vermont's being a "not greater than" modified comparative
negligence statute and Rhode Island's being a pure comparative fault statute, requires a jury
to disclose the name of an unidentified non-party to whom fault is to be assessed.
Id.
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tifiable driver of the red car" as sufficiently identifying a non-party for pur-
poses of specially pleading the non-party defense. If the court does permit
such identification, however, the jury should also be permitted to name the
"unidentifiable driver of the red car" so as to fulfill the name requirement
of the jury verdict form. 21
Recently, one Indiana appellate court has considered the question of
whether the defendant, who is responsible for pleading the non-party de-
fense under section Ten of the Act,2 2 must "name" that non-party with
specificity at the pleading stage in order to satisfy the jury verdict form
"name" requirement under section Six of the Act. 23 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals of Indiana answered this question affirmatively in Cornell
Harbison Excavating, Inc. v. May,224 striking the defendant's non-party de-
fense for failure to specifically "name" the non-party in its pleading.
The facts in Cornell Harbison are typical of many situations in which
the question will arise of whether the defendant must "name" the non-party
with specificity under the Act. The plaintiffs below, the Mays, were driving
their car when a dog ran into the roadway causing the driver to swerve into
a ditch in order to avoid hitting the dog. The defendant below, Cornell
Harbison Excavating, Inc., had placed drainage and sewer pipes in the
ditch for work they were doing in the median. When the plaintiff swerved
to miss the dog and went into the ditch, they struck the drainage and sewer
materials placed there by the defendants. The complaint alleged that the
defendant had negligently stored the pipes in the ditch. In its answer, the
defendant, Cornell Harbison, attempted to plead the fault of a non-party by
naming the "unknown owner of the dog." 25 At trial, the plaintiff argued
that the attempted identification of the "unknown owner of the dog" should
be stricken because of the Act's policy of ensuring maximization of recov-
ery by plaintiffs when the non-party cannot be identified.126 In response, the
defendant argued that the policy underlying the Act is to allocate percent-
age of fault to all persons responsible for a plaintiff's injury regardless of
whether they have been specifically named .22
221. See Wilkins, supra note 168, at 739 n.234. "The requirement of section six [of the
Indiana Comparative Fault Act], that the party be named, probably does not mean that the
defense will fail unless the person can be named with specificity. Under proper circumstances,
a 'John or Jane Doe' identification should suffice." Id.
222. See IND. CODE § 34-4-37-10, supra note 2.
223. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6, supra note 2.
224. 530 N.E.2d 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
225. Id. at 772.
226. Id. at 772. See also, Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 920.
227. 530 N.E.2d at 772. While the Cornell Harbison court rejected this argument, other
courts have accepted such an argument for identification of unknown non-parties. See Jacobs
v. Milwaukee and Suburban Transport Corp., 41 Wis. 2d 661, 165 N.W.2d 162 (1969). And
see, Wilkins, supra note 168, at 739 n. 234. "The requirement of section six [of The Indiana
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In its holding, the court noted that two schools of thought have devel-
oped on the subject of apportionment of fault to unidentified tortfeasors.2 8
The court reasoned that the Indiana Act clearly implied that a claimant's
recovery is not to be diminished by the percentage of fault of unidentified
non-parties,22 9 thus adopting the limited approach to fault apportion-
ment.230 Therefore, the court held, the defendant's attempted identification
of the "unknown owner of the dog" was an insufficient naming of the non-
party in order to plead the fault of the non-party, and the non-party defense
was stricken. 231 Thus, one Indiana court has concluded that in order for
fault to be assessed to an unidentifiable non-party, that non-party must be
"named" with specificity at the pleading stage in order to fulfill the section
Six "name" requirement of the jury verdict form.
Other jurisdictions have also considered the question of apportioning
fault to unknown non-parties. A Wisconsin court has permitted the use of
"the unknown driver of the red automobile" as sufficient identification for
fault assessment purposes. In Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport
Corp.,2 3 2 a passenger brought an action against a bus company for injuries
sustained by the passenger during a fall in the aisle of a bus. The bus had
made a sudden stop to avoid colliding with a car which darted out in front
of the bus. In apportioning negligence, the jury assessed 69 percent of the
causal fault to the "unknown driver of the red automobile, '233 and the Wis-
consin Supreme Court found no reason to upset this apportionment of negli-
gence.234 Unlike the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, the Wisconsin statute
does not require the jury to disclose the name of the non-party to whom
fault is being assessed.235 However, it is evident that the Wisconsin court
Comparative Fault Act], that the party be named, probably does not mean that the defense
will fail unless the person can be named with specificity. Under proper circumstances, a 'John
or Jane Doe' identification should suffice." Id.
228. 530 N.E.2d at 772. See also, supra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 773.
230. See supra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
231. 530 N.E.2d at 774.
232. 41 Wis. 2d 661, 165 N.W.2d 162 (1969).
233. Id. at 663, 165 N.W.2d at 163.
234. Id. at 665, 165 N.W.2d at 164. See also Varnado v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 So.
2d 1343, 1345 (La. App. 1984) ("the driver of the white Cadillac" found to be 60% at fault;
plaintiff unable to recover that portion assessed to the unknown driver); Bartlett v. New Mex-
ico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (1982) ("the driver of the unknown lead car"
found to be 70% at fault; plaintiff denied recovery for that portion assessed to the unknown
car).
235. The Wisconsin statute, in the 50% form of modified comparative negligence,
states,
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the
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would accept "the unknown driver of the red automobile" as sufficient iden-
tification of an unidentifiable non-party to allow the jury to allocate fault to
the non-party.
Allowing an unidentifiable non-party to be sufficiently named by being
identified as "the unknown driver of the red automobile" or a "John or Jane
Doe" will allow for pure comparison of fault 36 and also for full apportion-
ment of fault.2 7 Although full fault apportionment is deemed necessary in
many jurisdictions,23 8 Indiana courts have rejected the goal of complete
fault apportionment by limiting fault allocation only to parties to the action
if the non-party defense is not specially pleaded.23 Thus, the argument as-
serted in Cornell Harbison and accepted by the court is that Indiana will
compromise complete fault assessment, and will require a specific identifica-
tion of the unidentifiable non-party at the pleading stage before fault will
be assessed to a "phantom" or unidentifiable non-party tortfeasor 40
Permitting an unidentifiable non-party to be sufficiently named by an
"unknown driver of the red car" or "unknown owner of the dog" declara-
tion may result in the use of the non-party defense by named defendants to
fraudulently reduce their own assessed fault.241 Furthermore, construing
''name" in vague terms to allow for a "John or Jane Doe" identification will
result in line drawing by the courts causing conflicting results and inconsis-
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1983).
Compare the Wisconsin statute with IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6 (Supp. 1987). "if the evi-
dence in the action is sufficient to support the charging of fault to a nonparty, the form of
verdict also shall require a disclosure of the name of the nonparty and the percentage of fault
charged to the nonparty." Id.
But see Becker, supra note 3, at 882.
The Act required disclosure of the name of the nonparty in order to prevent the possibil-
ity of the 'phantom defendant.' However, the disclosure requirement was unfair to de-
fendants who could not identify an at-fault nonparty who had left the scene or was una-
ware of his fault. The 1984 amendment dropped the disclosure requirement for at-fault
nonparties...
Id.
This statement is a bit curious because the Act still requires the name disclosure requirement.
See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6 (Supp. 1987).
236. See supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Heft and Heft, supra note 158, at 52. "but the search is for the truth
- and the percentages of liability of all tortfeasors, parties or not, are necessary to consider
before the truth can be determined." Id.
239. Walters v. Dean, 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
240. See Cornell Harbison Excavating, Inc. v. May, 530 N.E.2d 771 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988).
241. Pardieck, supra note 187, at 936 n.64. "presumably [identification of a nonparty by
name] will prevent fault allocation to phantoms and guard against fraudulent assertions of the
nonparty defense." Id. This important policy reason was not pointed out by the court in the
Cornell Harbison decision.
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tencies. Also, allowing for a "John or Jane Doe" identification raises policy
issues of who is to bear the burden of any fault assessed to the "phantom".
It is clear that the Indiana Act favors maximizing recovery by the in-
jured plaintiff at the expense of the party-defendant, especially when the
non-party cannot be identified. 2" Thus, fault allocation to an unidentifiable
non-party tortfeasor, or "phantom", is not favored by the Indiana Act, and
an attempted "unknown driver of the red car" or "John or Jane Doe" or
"unknown owner of the dog" identification is insufficient for purposes of
pleading the non-party defense under section Ten of the Act. In fact, al-
lowing for a vague identification of a non-party for fault assessment pur-
poses under the Act will defeat the expressed legislative intent favoring a
plaintiff's recovery since a party-defendant will be able to reduce his own
fault by having fault apportioned to a "phantom", and no remedy exists for
a plaintiff to recover from a "phantom" unless that "phantom" is somehow
subsequently identified. Hence, since the "unknown driver of the red car"
or "John or Jane Doe" identification should not be allowed when the de-
fendant specially pleads the non-party defense under section Ten, the jury
should not be permitted to use the "unknown driver of the red car" or
"John or Jane Doe" identification to fulfill the "name" requirement on the
jury verdict form required under section Six of the Act. Therefore, until the
legislature adds a definition of "name" to the Act the Indiana courts should
continue to disallow a "John or Jane Doe" or "unknown owner of the dog"
identification.
The second principal manner in which a court may proceed in resolv-
ing the "name" issue is to adopt the reasoning and policies underlying the
automobile cases in which uninsured motorist coverage is denied when a
"phantom" or hit-and-run driver is involved. In Ely v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co.,2"s an insured brought an action against the insurer under an
uninsured motorist policy provision claiming damages from a hit-and-run
driver. The court denied recovery to the insured under the then existing
Indiana insurance statute provision covering uninsured motorists,2 (4 since
the insured could not prove his damages had been caused by contact with
the hit-and-run driver in accordance with the insurance policy's physical
contact rule. The physical contact rule requires physical contact with the
hit-and-run driver24 5 before recovery will be allowed.
242. See Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 920.
The Indiana Act is mildly tarnished by the sacrifice [of true apportionment of damages
among all tortfeasors in proportion to their fault] in favor of maximizing recovery by the
injured plaintiff when the nonparty cannot be identified. This seems to be the most
blatent instance in the act of a shifting of priorities.
243. 148 Ind. App. 586, 268 N.E.2d 316 (1971).
244. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (Supp. 1988). Repealed by Acts 1982, P.L. 166, § 6. See
now, IND. CODE §§ 27-7-5-2, 27-7-5-4 and 27-7-5-6 (Supp. 1988).
245. See, e.g., Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Lamb, Ind App. , 361 N.E.2d 174 (1977).
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In its holding, the Ely court outlined the policies underlying the statute
and the physical contact rule and noted that the prevalent policy in prevent-
ing recovery from hit-and-run drivers in these situations is to prevent fraud-
ulent claims.248 Similarly, the policy requirement denying recovery from a
hit-and-run driver under the uninsured motorist statute is also one of the
main policies underlying the identification of a non-party by name with
specificity.247 Hence, since the policy underlying the physical contact rule
under the uninsured motorist statute and the requirement that the non-
party be named with specificity is the same, following the reasoning out-
lined in Ely, the jury will be precluded from assessing fault to a non-party
or "phantom" tortfeasor unless the "phantom" can be named with specific-
ity in order to prevent fraudulent claims.
A third alternative for a court is to focus on the language of the Indi-
ana Act. Thus far, two Indiana courts have solved problems arising under
the Indiana Comparative Fault Act by looking at the legislative history and
by interpreting the legislative intent. In Huber v. Henley,' 8 the court inter-
preted the non-party provision of the Act and noted that,
the provisions of Indiana's Comparative Fault Act signal a legis-
lative policy favoring the principle of fair allocation among all
tortfeasors. In most instances, the legislature gave this principle
preeminence over the objective of fully compensating plaintiffs
. . . Any interpretation of legislative intent must therefore be
made with a cognizance of this policy."49
In light of the Huber court's interpretation of legislative intent, a de-
fendant can argue that naming an unidentifiable non-party as a "John or
Jane Doe", or as the "unidentifiable driver of the red car", should suffice
for allocation of fault to unidentifiable non-parties. This argument is consis-
tent with a legislative policy favoring a fair allocation among all tortfeasors
246. Ely v. State Farm Auto Ins., 148 Ind. App. at 590, 268 N.E.2d at 319.
247. See Pardieck, supra note 187, at 936 n.64. "Presumably [identification of a non-
party by name] will prevent fault allocation to phantoms and guard against fraudulent asser-
tions of the nonparty defense." Id.
248. 656 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
249. Id. at 511. In addition the court noted,
In return for the removal of the contributory negligence bar to recovery, plaintiffs lost the
ability to recover the full measure of damages from any one joint tortfeasor. With this
abolition of joint and several liability, the legislature favored strict apportionment of fault
and left the burden of damages attributable to insolvent tortfeasors, inadvertently omitted
tortfeasors, intentionally omitted tortfeasors, and jurisdictionally unavailable tortfeasors
on plaintiffs. Any interpretation of legislative intent must therefore be made with a cogni-
zance of this policy ...
Id.
Note that the court did not include unidentifiable tortfeasors in the legislature's list of
tortfeasors from whom the plaintiff could recover.
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at the expense of full recovery by a plaintiff.25  However, as noted earlier,
251
the Indiana Act appears to favor maximizing recovery by the injured plain-
tiff. In addition, while it may be argued that the non-party defense in sec-
tion Ten of the Indiana Act further supports the argument that a non-party
may be "named" by a "John or Jane Doe" identification by allowing a
defendant to specially plead and attempt to prove the fault of a non-
party,2 52 there is still the requirement in section Six of the Act that the jury
"name" the non-party on the jury verdict form.
The Cornell Harbison53 court also considered the legislative history
and legislative intent in reaching its result that fault cannot be assessed to
an unidentifiable non-party.25 The Cornell Harbison court noted that legis-
lative intent is most important in construing any statute, and concluded
"these statutes as presently written [The Comparative Fault Act], coupled
with their legislative history, clearly evidences the legislature's intent to
place the burden of pleading and proving the specific name of the non-party
on the defendant. 2 55
Rather than interpreting the legislative history and intent of the Act, a
court could interpret the plain meaning of the statute.215 Section Five of the
Act instructs the jury to determine the percentage of fault "of any person
who is a non-party. 2 5 Together with the requirement in section Six that
250. See Wilkins, supra note 168, at 734-36.
251. See supra note 242.
252. See Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 904 "[T]he Indiana nonparty provision has sig-
nificantly altered the distribution of the burden of plaintiff's injury and damages and has
shifted a substantial risk of non-recovery to the plaintiff." Id.
253. Cornell Harbison Excavating, Inc. v. May, 530 N.E.2d 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
254. Id. at 773.
255. Id. It is also important to note that the court made reference to the "statutes as
presently written" intended to preclude fault assessment to unidentifiable non-parties. As this
Note concludes, the legislature should amend the statutes as presently written to remove any
doubt as to whether an unidentifiable non-party can be named with specificity.
256. See Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking, Co., 659 F. Supp. 430, (N.D. Ind. 1987). In
construing the Indiana Comparative Fault Act's definition of "employer" the court noted that
the General Assembly did not, however, define "employer" to include all persons in the
same employ as the claimant; the General Assembly did not choose to use a term marked
by ambiguity. The General Assembly chose to use the term 'employer'. If the plain lan-
guage of the statute is clear, courts are not to look beyond the statute's words to interpret
the statute.
Id. at 434. See also Govern. Interinsurance Exch. v. Khayyata, 526 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988). In construing The Indiana Comparative Fault Act's 180-day notice provision the court
noted that "Nonetheless, the legislature chose to include such an exception, and where the
meaning of the legislative enactment is clear and unambiguous, our duty is to give effect to the
plain and manifest meaning of the language used and apply the provision as the legislature
intended." Id. at 747.
257. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5(a)(1), supra note 2.
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the jury "shall require a disclosure of the name' 258 of the non-party on the
jury verdict form, an argument can be made that sections Five and Six
indicate that the legislature intended that the non-party be "named" with
specificity. In addition, the language "the verdict form shall require" 259
lends further support to the argument that the non-party must be "named"
with particularity. "Shall" is generally defined as mandatory,6 0 and
"name" cannot be by a description or abbreviation.26 1 Therefore, read to-
gether, "The form of verdict also shall require a disclosure of the name of
the non party, 2 2 clearly mandates that "name" in section Six of the Act
means the literal name of the non-party. Thus, any other attempted identifi-
cation of a "phantom" non-party by an "unidentified driver of the red car"
or "John or Jane Doe" designation will be insufficient to "name" a non-
party for fault assessment purposes under section Six of the Act. This
seems more evident given the fact that section Six is the only time the
"name" requirement appears in the comparative fault statute, thus indicat-
ing that the legislature contemplated a literal "naming" of the unidentifi-
able non-party with specificity before that party will be considered in the
fault assessment scheme.263
Obviously, there is room for doubt as to what will sufficiently consti-
tute "naming" an unidentifiable non-party for fault assessment purposes.
However, it is clear that in many instances it is to a defendant's advantage
to be able to "name" an unidentifiable non-party to reduce the allocation of
fault to the defendant.264
Many cases from other jurisdictions which have not allowed considera-
tion of unidentifiable "phantom" tortfeasors in the fault apportionment
scheme have relied on statutory interpretation. 65 For example, in Baldwin
258. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6, supra note 2 (emphasis added). "Name" is defined in
Black's Law Dictionary to "consist of one or more Christian or given names and one surname
or family name. It is the distinctive characterization in words by which one is known and
distinguished from others, and description, or abbreviation, is not the equivalent of a 'name'."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (5th ed. 1979).
259. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6, supra note 2.
260. As defined in WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1056 (7th ed. 1984),
shall means, "used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory" (emphasis
added).
261. See supra note 258.
262. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6, supra note 2.
263. In its holding the Cornell Harbison court made reference to these statutes but did
not emphasize the "shall" language in section Six. See Cornell Harbison Excavating, Inc. v.
May, 530 N.E.2d 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
264. See supra note 161.
265. See, e.g., Payne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. McKiness Excavating & Grading,
Inc., 382 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1986); Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa
1985).
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v. City of Waterloo,"' the plaintiff brought an action against the defend-
ants who had negligently allowed a pole to be placed in the street. The
plaintiff was injured when his car struck the pole. The defendants at-
tempted to have "unidentified vandals" taken into account for fault assess-
ment purposes, but the court did not allow the alleged negligence of the
vandals to be considered. 267 In interpreting the Iowa comparative fault stat-
ute's definition of "party '"68 the court specifically noted that "a 'party' in-
cludes third-party defendants and certain persons who have been released,
but it does not include unidentified persons.1
2
11
While the Iowa court's interpretation is consistent with the Iowa stat-
ute, the Indiana Comparative Fault Act specifically dictates that the "per-
centage of fault of the claimant, of the defendants, and of any person who
is a nonparty" be taken into account for fault assessment purposes. 70 The
Indiana court's interpretation in Walters v. Dean,27 1 allowing the non-party
to be taken into account for fault assessment purposes only when the non-
party defense is specially pleaded by a defendant, is also consistent with the
Indiana statute allowing for fault assessment to non-parties. Therefore,
since the Indiana Comparative Fault Act anticipates taking into account
the fault of non-parties when the non-party defense is specially pleaded, an
argument may initially be made that a "John or Jane Doe" identification
should suffice to include an unidentifiable non-party in the fault apportion-
ment scheme.272 The "John or Jane Doe" identification may initially suffice
because the Act only requires the non-party defense under section Ten to be
specially pleaded. However, after this initial threshold question is addressed
266. 372 N.W.2d 496 (Iowa 1985).
267. Id. Iowa has also recently precluded apportionment of fault to unidentifiable non-
parties. See Selchert v. State, 420 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1988).
268. IowA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (1987) defines "party" as,
1. A claimant,
2. A person named as defendant,
3. A person who has been released,
4. A third-party defendant.
Id.
269. Baldwin, 372 N.W.2d at 493.
270. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1988).
271. 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
272. The Indiana Act's definition of "nonparty" as "a person who is, or may be, liable to
the claimant . . . " also supports the argument that unidentifiable tortfeasors sufficiently
named shall be taken into account for fault assessment purposes. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2
(Supp. 1988). Further strengthening the argument that an unidentifiable non-party may be
"named" by a "John or Jane Doe" identification is Indiana Trial Rule 17(F) which reads:
(F) Unknown Persons. When the name or existence of a person is unknown, he may be
named as an unknown party, and when his true name is discovered his name may be
inserted by amendment at any time.
Id.
See also, Honda Motors Co., Ltd. v. Parks, 485 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
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the question then becomes what will be sufficient to "name" the "phantom"
on the jury verdict form as required in section Six. As noted,273 policy rea-
sons and implicit statutory language suggest that a non-party must be
named with specificity.
If a court accepts the identification of "the unknown driver of the red
car" as specially pleaded by a defendant in the non-party defense, judicial
line drawing will be necessary, varying with the circumstances of each case,
and resulting in numerous inconsistencies. In addition, accepting a vague
identification of an unidentifiable non-party will promote fraudulent use of
the non-party defense by defendants. Finally, by focusing on the language
of the Indiana Act, different courts may derive varying conclusions as to the
legislative intent or plain meaning of the statute, and thus will arrive at
different results. While any of these arguments could be accepted by the
court, it would be easier for the legislature to avoid speculation and possible
confusion by solving the problem.
In addition, while the Cornell Harbison court reached the correct re-
sult in its decision, the precedential effect of its holding is unfortunate.
Since two schools of thought have developed on this subject,27' and since
this problem frequently occurs, many arguments can be made to support
the opposite result.2 75 If another Indiana court reaches the opposite result,
the practitioner will again be confused as to whether the unidentifiable non-
party must be named with specificity or whether an "unknown owner of the
dog" identification will suffice. In some courts fault will then be assessable
to "phantoms" while in other Indiana courts the defendant will be required
to specifically "name" the non-party. This confusion will undermine the de-
clared intent of the Act of predictability and greater equity.2 76 Thus, the
Indiana courts should leave the resolution of this problem to the legislature,
who should act to add a definition of "name" to section Two of the Act.
B. Solving the "Name" Problem by Legislative Amendment
To clarify other sections of the comparative fault statute, explicit defi-
nitions of necessary words are given.277 However, nowhere in the Act is
"name" defined. How "name" is defined for purposes of the verdict form
requirement of the Indiana Act 278 will determine whether fault will be as-
273. See supra notes 232-64 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 228. See also supra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text. See also Wilkins, supra note 168,
at 739 n. 234.
276. See Becker, supra note 180 and accompanying text.
277. See IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2, supra note 2, defining "Fault" and "Nonparty". In
fact, the original Act was amended in 1984 to add a definition for "Nonparty" and to amend
the definition of "Fault" as used in the Act. See P.L. 174-1984, § 1.
278. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-6 (Supp. 1988).
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sessed to a "John or Jane Doe", or whether fault will be allocated only to
those parties proceeding to trial . 79 A mere addition to the definitions sec-
tion of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act 8' to clarify the definition of
"name" as it is used in the jury verdict form requirement of section Six of
the Act will avoid the continuing need for judicial resolution of what suffi-
ciently constitutes "naming" an unidentifiable non-party.
Specifically, the legislature should amend section Two of the Indiana
Comparative Fault Act to add a new definition to read:
"Name", as used in this chapter, means the designation of an
individual person, firm, corporation, organization, or any other
entity, sufficient for the legal service of process to be effectuated.
By amending the Indiana Comparative Fault Act to include this defini-
tion of "name", the legislature will avoid speculation and confusion over
what will sufficiently constitute "naming" an unidentifiable non-party for
fault allocation purposes. In Indiana, the legal service of process is governed
by Trial Rules 4 through 4.17.81 Requiring an unidentifiable non-party to
279. See Walters v. Dean, 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
280. IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2 (Supp. 1988).
281. Rule 4. Process
(A) Jurisdiction over parties or persons - In general. The court acquires jurisdiction
over a party or person who under these rules commences or joins in the action, is served
with summons or enters an appearance, or who is subjected to the power of the court
under any other law.
(C) Form of summons. The summons shall contain:
(1) The name and address of the person on whom the service is to be effected;
(2) The name of the court and the cause number assigned to the case;
(3) The title of the case as shown by the complaint, but, if there are multiple parties,
the title may be shortened to include only the first named plaintiff and defendant with an
appropriate indication that there are additional parties;
(4) The name, address, and telephone number of the attorney for the person seeking
service;
(5) The time within which these rules require the person being served to respond,
and a clear statement that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default may be
rendered against him for the relief demanded in the complaint.
The summons may also contain any additional information which will facilitate
proper service.
Rule 4.1 Summons: Service on individuals
(A) In general. Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a
representative capacity, by:
(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or
other public means by which a written acknowledgement of receipt may be requested and
obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested
and returned showing receipt of the letter; or
(2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally; or
(3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling house or usual
place of abode; or
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be "named" through the methods of legal service of process will insure that
an unidentifiable non-party cannot be "named" without specificity and
proper identification,28 2 and will effectuate many of the goals underlying the
Comparative Fault Act; namely, maximizing an injured plaintiff's recov-
ery,283 and preventing fraudulent use of the non-party defense.28 4 While this
definition does not allow for the use of a "John or Jane Doe" or "unidentifi-
able driver of the red car" or "unknown owner of the dog" identification to
satisfy the jury verdict form requirement, it will provide for consistency.
Arguably, this definition compromises the legislature's goal of true
fault comparison.2 85 However, this compromise is made in application of the
non-party defense provisions when the non-party defense is not specially
pleaded. 286 In addition, the legislature seemingly made a conscious decision
to forego true fault apportionment among all tortfeasors in favor of com-
pensating plaintiffs, especially when a non-party cannot be identified.287 By
requiring a "naming" of the unidentifiable non-party with specificity under
the Act, the legislative intent of compensating plaintiffs when a non-party
cannot be identified will be fulfilled.
In addition, since one of the goals of any comparative fault system is to
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, the plaintiff's recovery will not be
defeated if an unidentifiable non-party cannot be taken into consideration
for fault assessment purposes. Also, the proposed definition of "name"
meets all of the goals of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act for plaintiffs as
(4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid agreement.
(B) Copy service to be followed with mail. Whenever service is made under Clause
(3) or (4) of subdivision (A), the person making the service also shall send by first class
mail, a copy of the summons without the complaint to the last known address of the
person being served, and this fact shall be shown upon the return.
IND. CODE, Trial Rules of Procedure (1988).
282. See, e.g., Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (automobile acci-
dent wherein court held service of process upon defendant's liability insurer was not sufficient
service of process to inform or to specify to the defendant of action against him).
283. See supra note 262.
284. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
286. See Walters v. Dean, 497 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
287. See Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 920.
The drafters of the Indiana Act were left to reconcile two competing considerations.
The first was the achievement of full comparative recovery for the plaintiff by ignoring
existing but unidentifiable tortfeasors. However, the drafter also had to consider a philos-
ophy which emphasized a true apportionment of damages among all tortfeasors in pro-
portion to their fault, irrespective of their amenability to suit and their solvency.
The Indiana Act is mildly tarnished by the sacrifice of the latter, more idealistic,
goal in favor of maximizing recovery by the injured plaintiff when the nonparty cannot be
identified. This seems to be the most blatent instance in the Act of a shifting of priorities
(emphasis in original).
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well as defendants. Amending the Act to include the proposed definition of
"name" will not overburden named defendants since fault will be assessed
to all parties, and will not result, automatically, in the named defendant
assuming the burden of fault of the "phantom". Furthermore, the fault of
any non-party "phantom" should be borne by all parties to the action which
supports the notion of each party bearing their share of fault.288
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Indiana's comparative fault system has been in effect for
only four years and is still experiencing "growing pains",289 most would
agree that the new system is a vast improvement over the outdated doctrine
of contributory negligence. Many of the issues unresolved by the Indiana
Comparative Fault Act are now beginning to make their way through the
Indiana courts and will continue to ease the Act's "growing pains". Other
problems, like the issue of "naming" an unidentifiable non-party for fault
assessment purposes, are unique to the Indiana Act and will call for unique
solutions by the legislature. The issue of what will sufficiently constitute
"naming" an unidentifiable or "phantom" tortfeasor has recently arisen,
and one Indiana court has adopted one of the several methods suggested to
resolve the problem of what will sufficiently constitute "naming" an uniden-
tifiable non-party for fault assessment purposes. However, the Indiana legis-
lature can avoid needless inconsistencies and confusion in the courts by ad-
ding the proposed definition of "name" to the Indiana Comparative Fault
Act. Since the proposed definition will add clarity to the application of the
Act, the Indiana legislature should heed Judge Barker's proclamation that
"the legislature may be called upon to mollify some of the Act's potential
harshness"2 90 and take corrective action to amend the Indiana Comparative
Fault Act to include the proposed definition of "name".
PETER H. POGUE
288. See Wilkins, supra note 168, at 734-39.
289. See Eilbacher, supra note 135, at 923.
290. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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